In a video posted on TikTok last night, Mabonga defended Cohen as a legitimate investor and portrayed himself as someone providing private security services to the businessman. The disclosure has added a new factor to the growing controversy surrounding Cohen, a foreign gold dealer whose activities in Uganda have increasingly drawn attention from security agencies, gold traders and, reportedly, the highest levels of government.

Mabonga came into the limelight after publishing the above mentioned footage of Mugumya, which spread widely on social media and triggered public outrage over the alleged treatment of the opposition activist while in detention. However, the footage also brought Lt. Herbert Mabonga himself under scrutiny.

His association with Cohen had previously been noted, and his appearance alongside the gold dealer raised questions about the businessman he was protecting and the circumstances under which Cohen had established himself in Uganda’s lucrative gold industry. Mabonga’s subsequent defence of Cohen has now made those questions even more difficult to ignore. For starters, it’s important to profile the person of Carlos Cohen.

Who is He 

Until recently, Cohen Ferreira Carlos Partricio was a relatively obscure figure in Uganda’s gold-trading circles. He moved around in an armoured vehicle, surrounded by the kind of security and pomp commonly associated with high-value gold dealers. But unlike many of the indigenous gold traders who have operated in Uganda for years, Cohen’s profile suddenly rose after a purported letter from President Yoweri Museveni to the Inspector General of Police, directing the police chief to personally supervise investigations into a multimillion-dollar gold scam.

The letter, whose authenticity has been questioned by some people familiar with its circulation, was titled “INTERVENTION IN A GOLD SCAM CASE” and addressed to IGP Abas Byakagaba. In it, President Museveni purportedly recounts a complaint from two gold buyers, Gafar Ibrahim and Nagi Muhammed, Cohen`s collegues, who claimed to have lost hundreds of thousands of United States dollars to individuals they described as fraudsters.

“I have got a letter dated the 29th of June, 2026 from two gold buyers by the names of Gafar Ibrahim … and Nagi Muhammed,” the purported presidential letter begins. According to the document, the two complainants had narrated how large sums of money were allegedly taken from them in a gold transaction and how they subsequently reported the matter to several security agencies.

Among those named were Col. Edith Nakalema, Senior Presidential Advisor on Anti-Corruption and head of the State House Investors Protection Unit; Brig. Gen. Henry Isoke, who heads the State House Anti-Corruption Unit; Crime Intelligence, headed by Gen. Christopher Ddamulira; Uganda Police Force under IGP Byakagaba; and the military intelligence authorities.

The letter purportedly expresses the President’s dissatisfaction with the progress of the investigations. “All these have not helped them,” the document states, before directing the Inspector General of Police to personally take charge of the matter. “This is therefore to direct you to personally oversee the investigation of this scam, apprehend these criminals and recover their money,” the letter says.

It then reportedly gives the police chief two months to resolve the matter, subject to verification of the complainants’ claims. “I give you 2 months to solve this problem if the accusers are saying the truth,” the letter states.

Copies of the purported correspondence were reportedly circulated to several of the parties involved, including Ibrahim Muhammed Gafar. Yet, while Cohen’s name does not appear in the presidential letter, we have traced the circumstances surrounding the complaint to a much more intriguing figure, Cohen Ferreira Carlos Partricio, commonly known as Carlos Cohen.

According to information obtained by The Investigator, Cohen is alleged to have been instrumental in facilitating access between Gafar and Nagi and senior authorities at State House. That development raises a larger question of who exactly, is Carlos Cohen, the foreign gold dealer whose business dealings have apparently attracted presidential attention?

Who Exactly Is Carlos Cohen?

Cohen Ferreira Carlos Partricio was reportedly born on September 30, 1978, in Angola, to Alipio Joaquim Ferreira and Celeste Cohen. His early life and movements remain difficult to independently establish, but available information suggests that he left Angola in the late 1990s and eventually settled in Portugal, where he is said to have acquired citizenship.

His nationality and identity have, however, become a subject of discussion. In some circles, he has reportedly been described as Portuguese, while other accounts have associated him with Israel. The circumstances surrounding these different descriptions remain unclear. More significantly, records reportedly obtained from Portugal point to a long-running criminal case involving a person bearing Cohen’s name.

The records relate to proceedings before the Albufeira District Court (Tribunal Judicial de Albufeira) in Portugal’s Algarve region. According to those records, Cohen has for years been wanted in connection with criminal allegations involving unlawful appropriation, fraud and document forgery.

The case reportedly dates back to the early 2000s and concerns allegations that, if established in court, could have serious consequences. The Portuguese proceedings are particularly significant because they reportedly show that the defendant became difficult for authorities to locate.

The Allegations

The first allegation cited in the Portuguese proceedings is unlawful appropriation. In general terms, unlawful appropriation involves taking, using or retaining property belonging to another person without lawful authority or consent. The precise legal meaning and applicable penalty depend on the circumstances and the relevant provisions of Portuguese law.

The second allegation is simple fraud, or burla simples. Under Article 217 of Portugal’s Penal Code, fraud generally concerns obtaining an unlawful financial benefit by causing another person to act under an error or deception.

The third allegation concerns document forgery, commonly referred to in Portuguese as falsificação ou contrafacção de documento. The relevant provision, Article 256 of the Portuguese Penal Code, addresses conduct involving the falsification, alteration or misuse of documents where the statutory elements of the offence are met.

The 2006 Court Ruling

The Portuguese court records provide an unusual insight into what happened after Cohen became unavailable to the authorities. The proceedings are identified under Common Trial No. 451/00.0JAFAR, with Notice No. 2467/2006. According to the records cited, the matter was before the 2nd Court of the Albufeira District Court under Judge Dr. Patricia Malveiro.

On May 18, 2006, Cohen was reportedly declared contumacious under Article 335 of Portugal’s Code of Criminal Procedure. In simple terms, a declaration of contumacy is a legal mechanism applied when a defendant remains absent from proceedings in circumstances provided for by law. It can result in the suspension of proceedings until the defendant appears or is arrested.

A subsequent ruling stated thus; “The declaration of contumacy, which expires upon the defendant’s appearance in Court or arrest…” The ruling further provided for the suspension of the trial pending Cohen’s appearance or arrest and outlined additional legal consequences arising from the declaration.

Among those consequences was the restriction of certain legal and administrative transactions and the acquisition of specified official documents. The court consequently suspended the proceedings pending his arrest or appearance. That development would leave the case hanging over Cohen for years.

From Portugal to Dubai

According to the account being investigated by The Investigator, Cohen subsequently left Portugal and travelled to Dubai. It is from Dubai, according to the same account, that his Ugandan chapter began. While in Dubai, Cohen became acquainted with individuals connected to Uganda, eventually being introduced to a Ugandan national identified as Joram Itungo.

Itungo is described in the account as a 36-years long-serving State House employee. According to sources cited in the investigation, Itungo became an important link between Cohen and Uganda. After establishing contact with Itungo, Cohen travelled to Uganda. It was here, according to the account, that his involvement in Uganda’s gold trade began to attract increasing attention.

The Gold Business and the Disputes

Uganda’s gold trade is a lucrative but controversial sector, involving local traders, foreign buyers, brokers, refiners, investors and intermediaries. For Cohen, the business appears to have involved transactions running into millions of dollars. One of the disputes associated with him concerns a transaction in which he reportedly approached police at the Entebbe Aviation Police (AVIPOL), claiming that he had been defrauded of gold worth approximately USD1.6M.

That complaint adds another layer to a story that has increasingly become complicated by competing claims of victimhood. On one side are gold buyers who say they were defrauded and have sought the intervention of Uganda’s security agencies and State House. On the other are questions surrounding Cohen’s own history, including the unresolved proceedings reportedly pending against a person bearing his name in Portugal.

The result is an unusual situation in which an individual whose past is itself the subject of unresolved legal questions has emerged as a central figure in a dispute in Uganda involving claims of gold fraud running into hundreds of thousands, and potentially millions, of dollars.

Why President Museveni`s Intervention  

The purported presidential letter is significant. Not merely because of the money involved, but because of the extraordinary number of security and anti-corruption institutions reportedly approached before the matter reached the President. The correspondence names State House anti-corruption officials, Police, Crime Intelligence and military intelligence authorities.

The President’s reported instruction that the Inspector General of Police personally oversee the investigation is therefore likely to attract considerable public interest. But there is another question that remains unanswered. Why did a dispute involving private gold transactions require intervention at the highest level of government?

And perhaps more importantly, what was the precise relationship between Cohen, the complainants and the individuals who facilitated their access to State House? Those questions are at the heart of the continuing investigation.

The Bigger Questions

Cohen’s story raises a number of issues that authorities may ultimately have to clarify. First, what is his precise immigration and citizenship status in Uganda? Second, what is the current legal status of the Portuguese proceedings reportedly registered against him? Third, was the Portuguese arrest warrant ever executed, withdrawn, cancelled or otherwise disposed of?

Fourth, what exactly brought Cohen to Uganda’s gold market? Fifth, what was his relationship with the Ugandan officials and intermediaries who reportedly helped him establish contacts?

And finally, what was the precise nature of the gold transactions involving Gafar Ibrahim and Nagi Muhammed that ultimately triggered the purported presidential intervention? These questions cannot be conclusively answered merely by the existence of court records or complaints. They require documentary verification, responses from the individuals named, and clarification from the relevant authorities.

For now, what is clear is that Cohen Ferreira Carlos Partricio has moved from relative obscurity to the centre of a gold controversy that has reached the highest levels of Uganda’s security establishment. His reported history in Portugal, his movement through Dubai, his arrival in Uganda, his links to influential intermediaries and the multimillion-dollar gold disputes surrounding him form a complex trail that raises more questions than answers.

And as the Portuguese proceedings reportedly remain tied to his appearance or arrest, the next chapter of the Cohen story may ultimately depend not only on what happened in Uganda’s gold market, but also on whether the long-running legal questions surrounding his past are ever brought to a final conclusion.

The controversy has also raised questions about the treatment of suspects, the protection of witnesses and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion after a criminal case had already reached the Chief Magistrate`s Court at Buganda Road, City Hall chambers.

Last Friday, September 18th 2026 at be precise, three gentlemen walked into our offices in Kisaasi, to supposedly give an account of the events surrounding what they described as a gold-deal-gone-bad. Their leader, Joseph, was already known to the newsroom. One of the men was a lawyer who presented the group as acting on behalf of Sheikh Bukenya.

Their account broadly followed the chronology contained in a complaint filed by lawyers representing the alleged victim, a Nigerian Prince, Muhammad Kwaido. But the appearance of the men also introduced another dimension to the story. According to the account presented to us, they acknowledged the broad chronology surrounding the transaction but expressed concern about the direction of the criminal proceedings and the possibility that the Sheikh could ultimately face legal consequences.

That account though, could not by itself establish criminal liability against anyone. Its common knowledge that the allegations remain matters for investigators, prosecutors and the courts to determine. However, what is now beyond dispute, is that the transaction has generated a formal criminal complaint, a court case, an arrest warrant and a separate complaint to the Director of Public Prosecutions over the handling of the case file.

From a Mosque to a Restaurant

According to the account given to the newsroom and the complaint by Prince Kwaido’s lawyers, the alleged transaction began with discussions at Old Kampala Mosque. Kwaido, a Nigerian national described as a prince, and who was in dire need of Gold, was introduced to people said to be connected to the prospective sellers. The discussions subsequently moved to the office of the 2nd Deputy Mufti, Sheikh Hafidh Muhammad Harunah Bukenya.

From there, according to the account, the parties moved to a restaurant in the vicinity of Gaddafi Mosque at Old Kampala, as negotiations over the purported gold continued. The transaction then took another step. The parties travelled to a selected smelting company where they were allegedly expected to receive three bars represented to the prospective buyer as genuine gold.

They waited for associates of the purported sellers to arrive with the bars. When the bars were eventually delivered, the group reportedly left the premises. The account presented to the newsroom states that the parties travelled in a vehicle belonging to the Deputy Mufti towards an area near the Nigerian High Commission. It was there, according to the complainant’s account, that payment was made through a USDT cryptocurrency arrangement.

The amount involved was USD288,000. At the prevailing exchange rate, that would amount to hundreds of millions of Uganda shillings, making the alleged transaction one of considerable financial significance. However, the gold later turned out not what it appeared to be! The deception, according to the complainant, only became apparent after the transaction had been completed.

The buyer began the process of documenting the gold and preparing it for export. It was during additional testing and verification that questions emerged over the authenticity of the three bars. Further examination reportedly established that the bars were counterfeit. That discovery transformed what had initially appeared to be a high-value commercial transaction into a criminal complaint.

For the buyer, the central question was no longer simply whether the gold could be exported. It was how three bars prior presented as genuine gold had passed through a chain of meetings and intermediaries, including locations associated with religious leadership, before being handed over in a transaction worth nearly US$300,000.

The Criminal Case

Nevertheless, the dispute subsequently entered the criminal justice system. The lawyers representing Kwaido have since identified the matter as CRB No. 085 of 2026, before the Chief Magistrate`s Court of Buganda Road, at City Hall. The complaint is principally against Lubega Muzamilu and others who are said to remain at large.

According to the September 8th 2026 letter, addressed to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Lino Anguzu, the complainant’s lawyers say the court had already issued criminal process against persons implicated in the case, including a warrant of arrest. The lawyers, from Ms Kaganzi & Co. Advocates, say their client became concerned after learning that the police file had subsequently been recalled by the Kampala Regional Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The file, they say, remained at the Regional DPP’s office even though proceedings had already commenced before Buganda Road Court. It is this development that has become the second major controversy surrounding the gold case. Why was the file recalled? The lawyers seem to task Anguzu to explain the glaring anormally.

In their missive, the lawyers, signed for by Lady Counsel Akatukwasa Dianha, do not object to the prosecutorial authorities reviewing a criminal file. Their concern is what they describe as the manner and circumstances of the recall. They argue that a review should be “transparent, expeditious and consistent” with the constitutional mandate of the DPP.

The lawyers are particularly concerned that the recall occurred after the matter had already progressed before court and after criminal summons and a warrant of arrest had reportedly been issued against the Mufti Sheik Bukenya.

The question they want answered is straightforward: Why was the file recalled, where is it now, and what is delaying its return or further action? Those questions are important because recalling a file for prosecutorial review is not, in itself, proof of wrongdoing. Prosecutors may review files for a variety of legal and evidentiary reasons. The issue raised by the complainant is whether the process in this particular case has been handled consistently and without improper considerations.

The Deputy Mufti Bukenya Question

The most sensitive part of the complaint concerns Sheikh Hafidh Muhammad Harunah Bukenya. The lawyers say their client considers the 2nd Deputy Mufti, their principal person of interest in the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction. They question why some individuals have been brought into the criminal process while, in their view, the Sheikh has not been subjected to similar action.

Their argument is that if credible evidence points to involvement by any individual, that person should be investigated according to the same standards regardless of office, social standing or influence they hold before the public. Akatukwasa specifically ask the DPP to independently examine the Sheikh’s alleged role in the events surrounding the transaction.

Importantly, the complaint itself does not amount to a finding of guilt against Sheikh Bukenya. Neither does the existence of a criminal complaint establish that the allegations made against him are utterly true, since those matters would have to be established through investigation and, where appropriate, judicial proceedings.

Fear of Witness Interference

Akatukwasa has also raised concerns about potential interference with witnesses. They argue that continued delay could create an opportunity for persons connected to the case to influence, intimidate, induce or otherwise interfere with material witnesses. This stance, if the same hasn’t been succeeded already!

The lawyers further describe their fears as an apprehension arising from what they say are the circumstances of the case and the alleged access that influential persons may have to individuals who could provide evidence. They therefore want the prosecution authorities to consider measures to ensure that witnesses can participate in the investigation and court process without intimidation or coercion.

This is potentially significant in any criminal investigation involving several participants, particularly where the prosecution’s case depends substantially on statements from people who were present during meetings, negotiations, payment or delivery of the alleged counterfeit gold.

Is There Selective Treatment?

Perhaps the strongest allegation in the lawyers’ letter is the suggestion of differential treatment among people implicated in the matter. The complainant’s lawyers point to the fact that warrants of arrest were reportedly issued against some suspects while Sheikh Bukenya, whom they consider “a person of interest”, has not been subjected to what they regard as equivalent criminal process.

They describe this as an apparent disparity. They stop short of dictating to the DPP how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised. Instead, they request an independent review of the circumstances surrounding the file and the people implicated in the investigation. Their position is essentially that status should not determine who is investigated or prosecuted.

Allegations of External Influence

The lawyers go further by expressing concern that external considerations could be affecting the handling of the file at the Kampala Regional DPP’s Office. This is an allegation contained in their complaint and not an established finding by The Investigator. They say the circumstances surrounding the recall and continued retention of the police file have created an apprehension that factors other than the evidence may be influencing the process.

Akatukwasa consequently asked the Director of Public Prosecutions, Lino Anguzu, to personally examine the matter. The request places the case at the intersection of two competing considerations; the DPP’s authority to review and direct criminal prosecutions, and the complainant’s expectation that a criminal case already before court should proceed without unexplained or unnecessary delay. Watch this space…

Matovu, 77, died at Kibuli Hospital after being attacked in the Kibuli Market Zone B area of Makindye Division in the early hours of September 24, 2026.

Police have opened a case of suspected murder and launched investigations into the circumstances surrounding the attack.

Kampala Metropolitan Police spokesperson Rachael Kawala said Matovu was attacked by unknown assailants before he was rushed to Kibuli Hospital, where he later succumbed to his injuries.

“Our task team is currently at the scene conducting investigations to establish the circumstances surrounding the incident,” Kawala said, adding that efforts were underway to identify and apprehend the suspects.

But as police began reconstructing the final moments of the celebrated musician’s life, conflicting accounts emerged about what happened before the fatal assault.

The girlfriend angle

Preliminary police information initially indicated that Matovu was attacked as he made his way for morning prayers.

However, accounts attributed to eyewitnesses and people familiar with the incident suggested that the musician had been at a woman’s home shortly before he was attacked.

One eyewitness account circulating on social media claimed that Matovu had dropped off a woman who has since been identified as Rose Tumusime and was subsequently confronted by another man believed to have been romantically involved with her.

Another account, attributed to a boda boda rider who reportedly helped take Matovu to hospital, also linked the assault to a dispute over a woman.

According to that version of events, an altercation developed after Matovu had been with the woman, with the other man allegedly first assaulting her before turning his attention to the musician.

The claims have triggered intense public debate because they present a very different picture from the initial description of the incident as an attack by unknown assailants.

Police have not, however, publicly established that Matovu was killed because of a romantic dispute. Reports indicate that investigators were interviewing the woman who was allegedly with him as they attempted to reconstruct the events leading to the attack.

The motive, identity of the attacker and exact sequence of events therefore remained under investigation at the time of publication.

The final journey

What is established is that Matovu was attacked in the Kibuli area in the early hours of Thursday.

He suffered serious injuries and was taken to Kibuli Hospital for treatment. Despite efforts to save him, he died.

Reports from the scene said residents gathered in the area as news of the attack spread, while police cordoned off the scene and began collecting information.

Other reports indicated that Matovu had been attacked as he headed towards morning prayers at Kibuli Mosque.

The circumstances surrounding the attack have left many Ugandans struggling to reconcile the violent death with the public image of a musician whose career had been defined by music, discipline and longevity.

A night on stage, a morning of tragedy

In another twist that has deepened the shock, Matovu had performed at an event in Kampala on Wednesday night, only hours before his death.

Tony Otoa, who said he had spoken to Matovu at the Sheraton that evening, recalled the encounter with disbelief. Otoa said Matovu had performed at a farewell party for the outgoing Executive Director of the Private Sector Foundation Uganda.

He said he spoke to the veteran musician about his late mother’s Afrigo music collection and the tapes he and his brother had traded.

For Otoa and many others who saw Matovu performing only hours earlier, news of his death was almost impossible to comprehend.

The contrast between the musician performing before an audience on Wednesday night and being pronounced dead after an attack on Thursday morning has amplified the sense of loss across Uganda.

Ugandans react

News of Matovu’s death immediately triggered an outpouring of grief from musicians, journalists, politicians, fans and ordinary Ugandans.

Social media was filled with tributes to the veteran performer, with many remembering not only his music but also the role he played in building Uganda’s live-band culture.

Jim Spire Ssentongo, commenting on Matovu’s death, recalled efforts that had been made over the years to have the musician awarded an honorary PhD in music in recognition of his contribution to Uganda’s music industry.

He described the circumstances of Matovu’s death as tragic while paying tribute to his contribution to Ugandan music.

Other mourners focused on the alleged circumstances of the killing.

Posts circulating online expressed shock at reports that a dispute involving a woman could have preceded the attack, although those details remained subject to police investigation.

Some mourners questioned how a disagreement could escalate into violence that claimed the life of a 77-year-old music veteran.

The man behind Afrigo

Matovu’s death marks the passing of one of the central figures in Uganda’s musical history.

Born on June 19, 1949, in Kawempe, Kampala, Matovu began his professional music journey in the 1960s.

He joined the Thunderbirds Band in 1967, later moved to the Police Band and subsequently became part of Cranes Band.

When Cranes Band collapsed, Matovu and fellow musicians went on to establish Afrigo Band in 1975.

The group would eventually become Uganda’s longest-running and one of its most influential live bands.

Matovu served as its leader, vocalist and saxophonist while helping to nurture generations of musicians.

Afrigo survived political upheavals, changing musical tastes and major transformations in Uganda’s entertainment industry.

Its music became part of Uganda’s cultural memory, while Matovu became recognised as one of the country’s leading bandleaders.

New Vision previously described Matovu as central to Afrigo’s contribution to Uganda’s music industry, noting his role in maintaining discipline, guiding the band and nurturing its members.

A legacy cut short by violence

For nearly six decades, Matovu’s life was intertwined with music. His death therefore represents more than the loss of an individual performer. It closes a chapter in the history of Uganda’s live-band era.

But the immediate concern for police is not only preserving his legacy but determining exactly how he died.

Was Matovu simply the victim of a random attack as initially suspected, or did a confrontation involving a woman precede the fatal assault?

Did he leave a woman’s home shortly before the incident, as some eyewitness accounts claim?

Who confronted him, and why?

These are among the questions investigators must now answer.

Until those questions are resolved, the claims surrounding the alleged girlfriend and her lover remain allegations rather than established facts.

For now, Uganda mourns a musician who spent five decades entertaining generations.

Matovu’s final performance came only hours before his death. By Thursday morning, the saxophone had fallen silent.

The man who helped build Afrigo Band into a national institution was gone — not after a long farewell from the stage, but in a violent incident that has left his fans demanding answers.

Police say investigations are continuing and that efforts are underway to identify and arrest those responsible.

His prominence comes after the President supposedly penned a hard-hitting letter to the Inspector General of Police (IGP), purportedly directing him to investigate and cause arrest of several `crooks` who purportedly swindled the golden `investors`. In the letter, titled “INTERVENTION IN A GOLD SCAM CASE” and addressed to IGP Abas Byakagaba, the President gives stun directives.

“I have got a letter dated the 29^th of June, 2026 from two gold buyers by the names of Gafar Ibrahim on telephone number…., and Nagi Muhammed. In this letter, they give a long story of how hundreds of thousands of Dollars were stolen from them by fraudsters whom they, later on, reported to a host of security personnel,” the President`s letter, who`s authenticity many have contested, begins.

President Museveni went on to name the security personnel above as “Nakalema” (Col. Edith Nakalema, the Senior Presidential Advisor on Anti-Corruption and Head of the State House Investors Protection Unit), “Isoke” (Brig. Gen. Henry Isoke, the Head of State House Anti-Corruption Unit), “Crime Intelligence” headed by General Christopher Ddamulira, “Police” headed by the very addressee, IGP Byakagaba and, surprisingly “CMI”, a defunct intelligence organ which the President himself dissolved and rebranded it to Defence Intelligence and Security (DIS), also referred to as the Directorate of Intelligence and Security.

“All these (above) have not helped them… This is therefore to direct you to personally oversee the investigation of this scam, apprehend these criminals and recover their money,” Not synonymous of him, the President this time accompanied his directives with an ultimatum. “I give you 2 months to solve this problem if the accusers are saying the truth.” The President copied the letter to all concerned parties, including Ibrahim Muhammed Gafar, whose copy was leaked to the media.

Whereas the President`s letter doesn’t mention Cohen, we, at The Investigator Publications (U) Limited, authoritatively established that he is the one who actually secured Gafar and Nagi to the Old Man with a Hat`s audience. Nevertheless, in this article, we elect to know the person of the `investor` who attracted the First Citizen`s attention and anger that even led to him suppressing his security personnel`s ability.

Who Is Carlos Cohen?       

Born on September 30^th 1978 in Angola, the now 48yr Old Cohen Ferreira Carlos Partricio, also referred to as Carlos Cohen, is son to Alipio Joaquim Ferreira and Celeste Cohen, both little-known Angolan citizens. However, for reasons yet to be established, Cohen is reportedly a Persona non grata back in his own country of origin. This could be the reason he`s also known as a Portuguese and or, an Israelite.

Purportedly running from Angola in the late 90s, Carlos Cohen supposedly found his new home in Portugal, where he became a citizen. However, records sourced from Portugal, and particularly at the Albufeira District Court (Tribunal Judicial de Albufeira), located on Rua do Município road in Albufeira District, Algarve Region, indicates that he has been fugitive and a wanted man back home for quite a long time, 20 years to be exact.

Here, he`s accused of three counts, all pointing at fraud, embezzlement and character assassination, as well as working around bringing his competitors down or out of business, but all through unlawful means. However, in 2006, police failed to locate him and hence, returned the arrest warrant back to Court where, it was put on hold until his arrest is secured, no matter when.

The Pending Charges to His Name

In Portugal, Carlos Cohen is accused of Unlawful Appropriation. For starters, an unlawful appropriation charge is a legal accusation that a person has intentionally and wrongfully taken, used, or kept property belonging to someone else without their consent. It is a broad legal term often used interchangeably with theft, embezzlement, or stealing, depending on the jurisdiction and how the property was originally obtained.

The second charge is Simple fraud (burla simples in Portuguese). This one, in Portugal, is set out in Article 217 of the Portuguese Penal Code. Its definition and Elements Core Action include tricking someone or causing error through clever deception, to get illegal money and or goods for oneself or someone else of the criminal mind`s choice.

The third charge is Document forgery. This, again in Portugal, is governed by Article 256 of the Portuguese Penal Code (Código Penal). It is under the classification of falsification or counterfeiting of documents, also known as Falsificação ou contrafacção de documento. It is a prohibited conduct and the law there harshly penalizes one for committing it.

The third charge above is slapped onto anyone who, with the intent to cause damage to another person or the State, obtain an illegitimate benefit, or facilitate another crime, engages in any of the following; Manufacturing or producing a false document or its components, falsifying or altering a genuine document, abusing another person’s signature to forge a document. All the above crimes, Carlos Cohen, committed back home in Portugal.

Sensing the sensitivity and gravity of the charges to his name, Cohen reportedly elected to jump the bail and fled the country for good. His supposed first stop was in Dubai. Like in Angola, he is on the run and still badly wanted in Portugal over the said charges whose particulars of offense, The Investigator pledges to unveil in these pages, in the subsiquent articles about the matter.

Jumps Bail, Charges Put On Hold Pending His Arrest   

Upon Cohen proving stubbornly elusive, Justice Dr. Patricia Malveiro, then Judge of the 2^nd Court of the Albufeira District Court ruled in the common trial number 451/00.0JAFAR, under NOTICE number 2467/2006, that the trial be suspended pending the defendant`s arrest. This was after Cohen was declared contumacious on May 18^th 2006 under article 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

“The declaration of contumacy, which expires upon the defendant`s appearance in Court or arrest, has the following effects; 1- Suspending of the trial until the defendant`s appearance or arrest, 2- Nullity of patrimonial legal transactions entered into by the defendant after this declaration [and], 3- Prohibition on obtaining documents, including identity cards, drivers’ licences, passports and certificates,” reads Justice Dr. Patricia`s ruling on June 2^nd 2006.

For starters, Contumacy is a stubborn, wilful refusal to obey authority, a law, or a court order. In this case, Cohen`s intention of jumping the bail. From Portugal, Carlos Cohen allegedly ran and sought refuge in Dubai. From here, he would come to Uganda and deal in gold transactions that went bad at all trials. The last time, he reported a case at Entebbe Aviation Police (AVIPOL), claiming he had been reportedly swindled of gold worth USD1.6M.

However, as he helplessly loitered back in Dubai, a friend of his connected him to a Ugandan, a one Jordan Itungo. Then a 30yr long serving State House staff, Jordan Itungo offered the necessary help. Upon contacting Itungo, Cohen jumped on the next plane to Uganda. Here, Itungo did something for Cohen that he will regret to his grave…

Carlos Cohen The Ugandan:

Watch this space….

For contribution or any additions to this story, please contact the writer, strictly via WhatsApp +256752799909

The transaction, according to a statement made to police by Muhammad Ibrahim Abdullahi, a Nigerian national and diplomatic officer serving at the Nigerian High Commission in Kampala, involved a chain of meetings and introductions that included Uganda’s Second Deputy Mufti, Sheikh Dr. Hafidh Muhammad Harunah Bukenya. The account places the centre of the negotiations at Old Kampala Mosque, where the Deputy Mufti’s office reportedly became the starting point for discussions over the proposedgold deal purchase.

Whereas the statement does not establish that Sheikh Bukenya personally supplied or manufactured the counterfeit bars, the Deputy Mufti supposedly  introduced the Prince and his associates to people represented as legitimate gold dealers and later became involved in arrangements surrounding all the transactions.

The allegations remain subject to investigation and any persons accused of wrongdoing would be entitled to respond to them and to the presumption of innocence unless and until Court at City Hall determines otherwise.

A trusted introduction

According to Abdullahi’s statement, the events began in early August 2026 when he and a Nigerian medical doctor, also a staff with Mulago Hospital, a one Dr. Sadique, sought to source genuine gold. Sadique, the statement says, knew Sheikh Hafidh Muhammad Harunah Bukenya and had previously been contacted by him concerning gold issues.

The Deputy Mufti allegedly represented that he knew legitimate gold sellers and had a licence relating to gold transactions. That representation, according to Abdullahi, gave the prospective buyers confidence that they were dealing with people, including a respected and trustworth Mufti, who could provide genuine gold.

Abdullahi says him and Sadique subsequently met Sheikh Bukenya at Old Kampala Mosque, where they discussed the sourcing of gold. The Deputy Mufti allegedly confirmed that he had access to legitimate sellers and proposed that the Nigerians work with him and his business associates. But the first attempt quickly ran into trouble.

According to the statement, the first person presented as a seller produced what appeared to be gold but was subsequently considered counterfeit. The proposed transaction consequently collapsed. Rather than ending the search, however, the failed deal was followed by another approach.

Mufti Again Featres with a Second Seller

Abdullahi says that several days later, Sheikh Bukenya contacted Sadique again and claimed that he had found another person who possessed genuine gold. This time, the transaction was allegedly presented as urgent. Muhammad Kwaido, the earlier mentioned complainant and a brother to Abdullahi, attended a subsequent meeting at the Deputy Mufti’s office along with Dr. Sadique.

It was there, according to the statement, that Sheikh Bukenya introduced them to his associate, a man identified as Muzamiru, together with another person presented as the gold seller. Muzamiru has since been arrested and remanded. He was also identfied as Mufti Bukenya`s Personal Assistant. The participants discussed the proposed purchase, including the price, testing arrangements, processing and the procedure for completing the transaction.

The Deal Location Changes Repeatedly

Initially, the transaction was to take place at the Deputy Mufti’s office. Abdullahi says Sheikh Bukenya later changed the proposed location to a restaurant near the Gaddafi Mosque, explaining that his office lacked the electrical power socket required for the intended procedure. Gaddafi is the seat of Isilam faith in Uganda.

The Mufti supposedly suggested that the smelting of the gold could, if necessary, even be conducted from the restaurant at the Mosque. But the restaurant also proved unsuitable! According to the statement, the purported sellers considered the location too open and proposed moving the operation to Nureen Enterprises Ltd, a supposed smelting company of their choice.

The Refinery and the Three Bars

The group then proceeded to Nureen Enterprises in the outskirts of the Capital Kampala.  The people present at the refinery, according to Abdullahi, included Sheikh Bukenya, Muhammad Kwaido, Muzamiru, Dr. Sadique, Abdullahi himself and the person presented as the seller. They all waited for about two hours for the purported seller’s partners, a man and a woman, to arrive with the gold.

Eventually, the pair arrived carrying a bag with three bars purported to be gold. The transaction now entered a more technical stage. The parties were told that USD300 was required for smelting and testing the three bars. According to Abdullahi, they were assured that the money paid for testing and smelting would be refunded once the transaction was completed.

At that stage, Abdullahi says, he had no reason to suspect that the bars were fake. He says he relied on the representations of the people presenting the bars as genuine gold, the testing and processing procedures taking place at the refinery and, importantly, the confidence he placed in the people who had introduced the sellers, in particular Sheikh Bukenya and his associate Muzamiru. Following the testing and other arrangements, the purported sellers handed over a locked black toolbox containing the three bars.

The Payment

The group then left the refinery. According to Abdullahi, he temporarily held the locked toolbox as the group travelled in the Deputy Mufti’s vehicle to an area near the Nigerian High Commission. It was at this point that the payment mechanism allegedly changed from an ordinary cash or banking transaction, to cryptocurrency.

Sheikh Bukenya, the sellers and Muzamiru reportedly informed the buyers that payment would be made in USDT, a cryptocurrency commonly used for dollar-denominated transactions. Muzamiru was reportedly instructed to contact a USDT agent who could receive the money.

Abdullahi says the Nigerians contacted a forex agent known to them as Aminu and arranged for  the USD288,000 to be sent to the USDT agent introduced by the other side. The payment was eventually made. For the buyers, the transaction appeared to have been completed. But the most consequential part of the deal was yet to come.

The Gold Fails a Second Examination

After payment, Muhammad Kwaido proceeded with arrangements for documentation and the proposed exportation of the purported gold. It was during further examination and testing required before the gold could be documented and exported that the transaction unravelled. The three bars were subjected to additional testing.

According to Abdullahi’s statement, the results showed that they were not genuine gold bars. Instead, the bars were found to consist of steel or another base metal coated or plated with gold. The discovery transformed what had appeared to be a completed multimillion-shilling transaction into a case of sophisticated deception. The buyer had paid for three bars that were allegedly counterfeit.

The race back to the Deputy Mufti’s office

The discovery triggered an immediate attempt to confront those involved. Abdullahi says he and Kwaido contacted Sadique and went directly to Sheikh Bukenya’s office at Gadaffi Mosque. They informed the Deputy Mufti that the purported gold had failed the additional examination and showed him the bars.

The two Nigerians sought his intervention, according to the statement, because of what they described as his involvement in the transaction and because he had introduced Muzamiru as his business partner. In addition, Dr. Bukenya had earlier informed them how he had personally sourced the sellers from DR Congo and that they were in Uganda on his invitation and expense, hence the earlier mentioned urgency the transaction required.

That relationship, the statement suggests, was central to the confidence the prospective buyers placed in the deal. Abdullahi nevertheless makes a deliberate distinction about his own role. He says he was neither the owner, purchaser nor seller of the purported gold and did not introduce Kwaido to the individuals who presented themselves as sellers.

The Mysterious USD5,800

Beyond the headline figure of USD288,000, Abdullahi’s statement raises questions about smaller sums allegedly exchanged before the main payment. He says he was informed that the buyer had already given Sheikh Bukenya US$2,800 in connection with the transaction. He further says Sadique told him that he and the Deputy Mufti had added another USD3,000, allegedly calculated at US$1,000 per kilogramme. Together, the amounts were said to total TO USD5,800.

According to the statement, this amount was to be divided among four people, with each person receiving USD1,450. There was also reportedly a request for an additional USD3,000 from the buyer. Abdullahi says he communicated that request to Kwaido. But after the discovery of the counterfeit gold, he says he returned the USD2,400 he had personally received, to the buyer. The statement does not, by itself, establish the ultimate whereabouts or disposition of all the other funds allegedly paid in connection with the transaction.

Why the Deputy Mufti’s Role Matters

The most sensitive element of the allegations is not simply the counterfeit gold. It is the role allegedly played by a senior religious figure in bringing the parties together. Abdullahi repeatedly emphasises the trust attached to Sheikh Bukenya’s position. In his concluding remarks, he says the discussions concerning the transaction took place at the Deputy Mufti’s office and that those involved believed him to be a person of high integrity because of his position and status.

That confidence, if the account is substantiated, would have been a crucial element in the transaction. For the buyers, the presence and involvement of a senior religious leader allegedly gave credibility to people they did not otherwise know. The central question for investigators, therefore, is whether Sheikh Bukenya was simply an intermediary who was himself deceived by purported gold sellers, or whether he knew, or should have known, that the transaction was fraudulent. Remember he fully owned them before the buyer as his visitors from DR Congo.

A Transaction that Moved Through Trusted Spaces

The chronology described in the statement is striking. The prospective buyers were first brought into contact with the alleged sellers through discussions at Old Kampala Mosque. The transaction was then considered at the Deputy Mufti’s office. It was moved to a restaurant around Gaddafi Mosque.

From there, the parties went to a chosen smelting company, where they waited for the purported sellers’ associates to arrive with the three bars. After the purported gold was handed over, the group travelled in the Deputy Mufti’s vehicle to an area near the Nigerian High Commission. Payment was then made through a USDT arrangement.

Only after the buyer began the process of documenting and exporting the gold did additional testing expose the bars as counterfeit. It is this sequence that gives the allegations their extraordinary character. A transaction worth nearly three hundred thousand US Dollars  allegedly passed through a series of locations and intermediaries before the product was ultimately exposed as fake.

Questions Investigators will Have to Answer

As the matter proceeds to a full criminal investigation, several questions become central. Who supplied the three bars? The statement refers to a man and a woman who allegedly arrived with the purported gold, as well as the person initially presented as the seller. Establishing their identities and tracing their movements could be critical.

Who owned the gold, or knew where it came from? Investigators would need to establish the chain of custody of the three bars before they reached Nureen Enterprises. What did the refinery’s first tests actually establish? The statement says the bars underwent testing and processing before payment. Investigators will need to examine what tests were conducted, what their results were and whether the procedures could have been manipulated.

The, Who received the USD288,000? The money was reportedly sent in USDT to an agent introduced by the other side. Tracing the digital wallet addresses, intermediary accounts and eventual beneficiaries could provide an important financial trail.

What was the purpose of the additional payments? The alleged USD2,800, USD3,000 contribution and subsequent request for another USD3,000 will also require clarification. What exactly was the relationship between Sheikh Bukenya and Muzamiru? Abdullahi says Muzamiru was introduced as the Deputy Mufti’s business partner. Investigators would need to establish the nature of that relationship and whether it extended to the gold transaction. Did anyone know the bars were counterfeit before the payment was made? This may ultimately be the most important question.

The presumption of innocence

The allegations contained in Abdullahi’s statement are serious, but an allegation is not proof of criminal liability. The statement represents the account of one participant in the transaction and in our subsquent series, we shall test against the evidence of other participants, transaction records, communications, refinery records, CCTV footage, cryptocurrency transfers and forensic examination of the bars.

Sheikh Hafidh Muhammad Harunah Bukenya and the other people mentioned in the statement definitely have the right to provide their accounts of what happened. Surprisingly, in one of the clips before our desk, the Mufti of Uganda, Sheikh Ramathan Mubajje is seen on the table, supposedly as a reconcilliator after the bad deal. His statement too, will be sought for our better reporting of the matter.

For investigators, the task is to determine whether this was a case of criminals exploiting the reputation and connections of an influential religious figure, or whether the Deputy Mufti himself played a knowing role in a deliberate scheme to defraud the Nigerian buyer. For Muhammad Kwaido, however, the immediate reality was stark. Three bars that had been represented as gold were allegedly worthless base metal beneath a thin covering of gold. And US$288,000 had already changed hands!

In a wide-range interview with The Investigator last night, Brig. Gen. Henry Isoke, the head of SHACU, rejects suggestions that the unit has been inactive or that ministers are taking over its mandate. He says the current crackdown is the product of cooperation between government institutions, with SHACU providing intelligence, investigations and follow-up while ministers exercise their administrative and political mandates.

The interview comes against the backdrop of a nationwide anti-corruption campaign led by Minister Barugahara and his deputy Justine Nameere, which has seen inspections of local government institutions, investigations ordered against officials, and a growing number of interdictions.

The campaign has so far covered districts including Moyo, Maracha, Pakwach, Mbale, Namisindwa, Bulambuli, Isingiro, Sembabule, Mitooma, Mbarara, Fort Portal, Rakai and Masaka. By August 18^th, reports indicated that 110 local government employees were facing disciplinary action over allegations ranging from ghost beneficiaries and procurement irregularities, to misuse of public funds, absenteeism and poorly implemented projects.

In Jinja, Barugahara ordered the Chief Administrative Officer, Lilian Nakamatte, to step aside and directed SHACU and the Inspectorate of Government to investigate allegations of financial mismanagement, procurement concerns and maladministration.

The campaign has also resulted in interdictions in Mitooma, Isingiro, Buhweju and other districts. In Ankole alone, at least 26 officials were reported to be facing interdiction following recommendations for SHACU to facilitate investigations. At Buhweju, SHACU conducted investigations into several senior officials, while separate inquiries were ordered into alleged misuse of road funds. The two ministers have repeatedly insisted that the campaign is intended to restore accountability and improve service delivery.

The Ministry of Local Government says their inspections, follow-ups and interventions are part of President Yoweri Museveni’s renewed anti-corruption drive. However, the campaign has also attracted calls for caution. The Deputy Inspector General of Government, Dr Patricia Achan Okiria, recently advised the ministers to ensure that their operations remain within the law and respect due process.

Against this background, Brig Gen Isoke spoke to The Investigator about the origins and mandate of SHACU, its record, the role of ministers in the current crackdown, allegations of selective arrests and the money the unit says it has saved for the government.

The Investigator: Gen Isoke, elaborate on the mandate of the State House Anti-Corruption Unit since its creation in 2018.

Brig Gen Henery Isoke: As you may be aware, it is the executive duty and responsibility of the President of Uganda, Gen Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, to ensure that the State is running efficiently. Corruption has been a great concern of the President right from the five-year protracted bush war. Fighting corruption is among the top priorities of the NRM government. In fact, it is Point number seven of the ten-point programme.

After the war, it was not a bed of roses because other parts of the country were not fully liberated. Northern Uganda, Eastern Uganda, West Nile and some parts of Western Uganda remained volatile. Because the President and his government were preoccupied with many other issues, including uniting and liberating the other parts of the country, vices such as corruption received less attention.

When the country was finally liberated, the President turned his attention to other challenges, corruption being one of the diseases for which he sought mechanisms to combat. Institutions such as the Criminal Investigations Directorate, the institutions responsible for ethics and integrity, and the Inspectorate of Government became more visible after the NRA had fully liberated the country.

These anti-corruption agencies converge under the Inter-Agency Forum. Our operations are coordinated to avoid duplication of roles. We meet, plan our work and consult each other. Uganda has made significant efforts in fighting corruption through institutional and legal frameworks, government policies and the commitment of the President towards zero tolerance to corruption.

Despite these efforts, Uganda continues to feature in global and regional reports as a country affected by corruption. It is against this background that the President, acting under Article 99(4) of the Constitution, established the State House Anti-Corruption Unit on December 10th 2018. The unit was created to coordinate citizens’ corruption complaints to the Presidency with the population and constitutionally mandated agencies, with a view to obtaining speedy resolution of those complaints. Therefore, our core mandate is to help the President fight all forms of corruption and corruption tendencies.

The Investigator: What is the strength of SHACU and how do your officers execute their work?

Gen Henery Isoke: Our human resource is very minimal. We are not more than 30. To be precise, we are 25 and all of us are housed here at headquarters. We do not have regional offices. What we do is consult with sister agencies that have regional presence.

We receive a lot of communication from Resident District Commissioners, District Police Commanders and regional officers of the Inspectorate of Government. The fact that we are limited in numbers does not mean we have fallen short of our mandate. The team I lead is highly motivated. They are cadres and patriots motivated by the desire to serve Uganda. Our budget is also very small, but we have not failed to execute our mandate.

We have a 24-hour call center programmed in all languages of Uganda. Our officers are always available to receive queries from all parts of the country, from Kabale to Kotido. Besides the call center, we have a clients’ relations desk here. As you have witnessed, our front desk is one of the busiest in Kampala. Our front desk manager receives everyone who walks in with a complaint or any other issue. Indeed, we are more agile, faster and swifter.

The Investigator: Give us some figures. How many corruption cases has SHACU handled since its inception?

Gen Henery Isoke: The cases are so many. This is my fourth year here. Since this unit was formed, it has handled more than 800,000 cases. We have arraigned about 900 suspects in court and secured 165 convictions. Those arraigned include public servants, who represent about 55 per cent, while private-sector workers, mostly engineers and lawyers, represent about 45 per cent. Most of the cases we have handled are land-related, accounting for about 31 per cent.

The Investigator: Why is Local Government Minister Balaam Barugahara doing something that your unit should have done long ago? Some members of the public think SHACU is doing nothing.

Gen Henery Isoke: It is not correct to say that Hon Balaam is doing our job. As I have said before, we are working as a team. Following a directive by the President, Balaam responded very fast because the Local Government Ministry has a lot of corruption tendencies. Balaam is moving swiftly to clean the ministry, and that is a very big action. He is using our intelligence. Indeed, he moves where we have already conducted intelligence. We have strategized this with him and we are not complaining. It is us who make the arrests and follow up on the cases.

Hon Balaam is like any other Ugandan mandated to remain vigilant. He is acting within his mandate, and we give him all the support required. That ministry is too rotten, and most of the cases are perpetuated by technocrats. The current operation has therefore not been a competition between SHACU and the Ministry of Local Government. It is a coordinated effort.

The Investigator: People claim you have not done anything tangible since your appointment. How do you respond to Ugandans who say they have not felt your ‘tsunami’?

Gen Henery Isoke: I am not a media person. I am more comfortable working in the background. Given the nature of my training, most people may not see my face. We work very tirelessly in the background. We do not show off while executing our duties. That is how we were prepared for the job. Many people have different methods of work. I don’t subscribe to the culture of showing off. I prefer my actions to speak for my work.

For example, SHACU under my leadership did great work during the infamous mabaati investigations, arrests and eventual prosecutions. We looked at the files one by one and, based on our recommendations, action was taken, including arrests and prosecutions. In government, personal assistants can do a lot of the donkey work. That is one reason you may not see a ministers arrested. These ministers and the so-called `big fish` are sharp. Many of them do not leave behind trails of their wrongdoing. They use other people. That is why in many cases the small fish is the one that gets hooked because everything can be traced to them.

The Investigator: We have been approached by our readers complaining about selective arrests. What is your response?

Gen Henery Isoke: No one is big. We do not leave any stone unturned. In fact, we have arrested several top officials. But as I explained earlier, most top officials, including ministers, do not necessarily leave a trail showing their personal involvement in wrongdoing. They use their subordinates. Most personal assistants are therefore not safe. Our work is to follow the evidence. Whoever is implicated by the evidence must answer.

The Investigator: Brig Gen Moses Lukyamuzi, the head of the State House Land Protection Unit, has recently come under scrutiny, with some readers alleging that he abets land grabbing. Does SHACU have the mandate to bring him and his associates to book?

Gen Henery Isoke: No one is above the law, me inclusive. Anyone who has involved themselves in wrongdoing must answer for their crimes. We follow leads. If anyone has a trace of corruption, they are free to visit our offices and report. The principle is simple: nobody should be protected because of their position. However, our cause of action is always prompted by evidence, not assumptions.

The Investigator: In figures, how much money has SHACU helped to save for the country since you started your mission?

Gen Henery Isoke: We have so far recovered or saved UGX700 billion. Of this amount, under my tenure, we have saved over UGX500 billion. We have also managed to save UGX9 billion since the nationwide Local Government operation by Hon Balaam started, and we are seeing more money being saved.

The Investigator: Finally, what should Ugandans expect from SHACU as the Local Government crackdown continues?

Gen Henery Isoke: Ugandans should expect more action. The fight against corruption cannot be won by one institution. SHACU, the Inspectorate of Government, police, ministries, local governments and other accountability institutions have different responsibilities. But we must work together. The President’s message has been very clear; public resources must serve the people.

Our role is to receive complaints, gather intelligence, investigate and coordinate with the relevant agencies so that cases are resolved. We may not always be visible, but that does not mean we are not working. The work is continuous. And where there is evidence of wrongdoing, nobody should expect to be protected because of their office, rank or connections.

Across Uganda’s district headquarters, health centres, schools and roads, a new form of high-visibility government oversight has taken centre stage. Surprise field inspections led by the Minister of Local Government, Balaam Barugahara, alongside the Minister of State, Justine Nameere, have generated intense national debate. Their visits have exposed alleged ghost workers, payroll irregularities, questionable projects, poor construction and failures in service delivery.

For citizens exhausted by abandoned roads, dysfunctional health facilities and entrenched corruption, watching ministers leave their offices, descend on the field and demand answers feels like a long-overdue reckoning.

That public response should not be dismissed. As Vice-President Jessica Alupo recently observed, corruption is experienced most acutely by the ordinary Ugandan when a borehole breaks down, a school roof collapses or a health centre lacks basic medicines. Local government is where the citizen encounters the state most directly; it is therefore where public trust is either built or broken.

Balaam’s campaign has revealed something important: Ugandans want to see government acting. The energy is also spreading. Health Minister Dr Chris Baryomunsi has conducted surprise inspections at regional referral hospitals, while Works Minister Fred Byamukama has stepped up field inspections of infrastructure projects.

The question, therefore, is not whether this energy should be extinguished. It should not. The critical question is: what political architecture can sustain it and turn it into permanent state capacity?

Uganda already possesses a number of institutions charged with fighting corruption. The Inter-Agency Forum against Corruption brings together these public accountability institutions, with the Directorate for Ethics and Integrity serving as its Secretariat. Yet corruption remains deeply entrenched. The Inspectorate of Government has estimated that corruption costs Uganda roughly Shs9–10 trillion a year.

If highly visible ministerial interventions generate more public confidence than an elaborate accountability bureaucracy, the problem is not simply the absence of institutions. It is the failure to make those institutions function as a coherent national system. Uganda should therefore not extinguish Balaam’s spark. It should institutionalise it.

From Political Energy To State Capacity

The controversy surrounding some of the field methods has drawn legitimate warnings from local-government leaders and the legal fraternity. Public arrests, humiliation, prejudgment and disciplinary action without due process can raise serious constitutional and administrative-law concerns, particularly under Articles 28 and 42 of the Constitution. But it is equally important not to confuse unlawful enforcement with lawful inspection.

The Local Governments Act expressly gives the central ministry responsible for local government functions of guidance, inspection, monitoring and coordination. It also empowers authorised inspectors to enter premises, inspect records and investigate matters on their own initiative or following complaints. Those powers are intended to promote accountability, good governance and service delivery.

The problem, therefore, is not that ministers inspect local governments. The problem arises when inspection becomes trial, publicity becomes punishment and political pronouncement substitutes for lawful disciplinary or criminal proceedings.

The distinction matters

A district engineer who once treated an audit query as routine paperwork now knows that government may physically appear at a project site. A health worker accustomed to absenteeism knows that an unannounced inspection is possible. That visibility can have a deterrent effect.

But political energy is not institutional capacity. A campaign driven by individual personalities can expose failures; it cannot, by itself, build a durable accountability system.

The challenge is to convert visibility into systems, fearlessness into policy, and political energy into institutional capacity.

Follow The Money — And Follow It To The Centre

Local government officials found culpable of diversion, fraud or negligence must be held accountable. But Uganda’s corruption problem cannot be solved by policing the administrative periphery while failing to follow the money to its source.

The FY2026/27 Local Government Budget, including Parish Development Model funds, is about Shs8.2 trillion against a national budget of roughly Shs84.4 trillion. Local governments therefore account for less than 10 per cent of the national resource envelope.

Yet some of the country’s largest corruption risks lie beyond district headquarters: major procurement, infrastructure contracts, energy projects, debt-financed programmes, central ministries, classified expenditures, public enterprises and other large transactions where billions of shillings can be lost in a single decision.

The corruption that destroys a district road is tragic. But corruption embedded in a major central procurement contract can destroy dozens of district roads before a single tractor reaches the field.

This is why the current inspection campaign should travel up the accountability chain.

When an inspection uncovers a suspicious payroll, the question should not end with the district officer. Who authorised the payroll? Who verified it? Who failed to act on earlier audit warnings? If a road is badly constructed, who awarded the contract? Who certified the work? Who authorised payment? If a procurement price is inflated, who designed the specifications, who evaluated the bids, who approved the contract and where did the excess money go?

And when the Auditor General’s report identifies serious irregularities, the system should have a defined pathway for action.

That does not mean an audit finding should automatically produce a prosecution or forfeiture. Different institutions have different statutory mandates and evidentiary thresholds. But a serious finding should trigger mandatory consideration for the appropriate next step: procurement review, administrative action, criminal investigation, financial intelligence analysis, referral to the Inspectorate or Leadership Code machinery, or another lawful intervention.

The objective should be simple: nothing significant should disappear between detection and accountability.

Lessons From Matembe’s Tenure

Uganda’s own anti-corruption history offers a sobering lesson about what happens when political will encounters entrenched interests at the centre.

When Dr Miria Matembe became the country’s first Minister for Ethics and Integrity in 1998, heading a docket at full Cabinet level, she sought to use it as a serious political instrument for confronting abuse of power, corruption and the erosion of public integrity.

In her memoir, The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy Betrayed, Matembe recounts not simply individual battles but the gradual erosion and containment of the institutional architecture intended to make ethics and accountability effective. Her account is important because it demonstrates that the weakening of an accountability institution or framework does not necessarily occur through one dramatic abolition. It can occur gradually—through political resistance, conditional lukewarm support, institutional fragmentation, diminished authority and the marginalisation of the very offices expected to confront abuse of power.

Matembe’s eventual departure in 2003 did not end that process. Uganda continues to operate the portfolio under a State Minister in the Office of the President, while underfunding remains a persistent complaint and institutional challenge.

The lesson here is more important than the precise administrative chronology.

It is politically easier to demand integrity from a district officer than to construct institutions capable of demanding it from the political and financial centre.

That is why an anti-corruption strategy confined to inspections of district engineers, teachers, health workers and local officials risks treating symptoms while leaving the larger architecture of patronage and centralised procurement untouched.

Uganda’s anti-corruption institutions have grown in number and sophistication. What has not kept pace is the capacity to make them operate as a single, coordinated and effective accountability chain.

Restore A Full Cabinet Ministry And Strengthen The LAF

This is why Uganda should restore Ethics and Integrity to full Cabinet status. The proposal is not to create another command centre over the Inspectorate of Government, the Auditor General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Judiciary, the Police, the Leadership Code Tribunal or other independent institutions.

Those institutions must retain their constitutional and statutory independence. The proposal is instead for a dedicated, full Cabinet Ministry for Ethics and Integrity, with an independent budget vote, providing political leadership to the national anti-corruption strategy and strengthening the Secretariat of the Inter-Agency Forum.

This would be coordination without capture. The Minister would not command the IGG, direct the DPP, instruct the Auditor General, interfere with judicial decisions or dictate the outcome of investigations.

Rather, the Minister would ensure that the institutions responsible for different stages of accountability are connected by clear protocols and measurable national objectives.

An audit finding should not languish in an audit report. A procurement red flag should not disappear into a file. A criminal investigation should not become indefinitely dormant. A Leadership Code breach should not remain unresolved. Recovered assets should not disappear from public view.

The IAF should therefore be strengthened into a genuine national coordination mechanism, capable of tracking the movement of serious cases from detection and verification through investigation, prosecution, adjudication and recovery, while leaving each institution to exercise its own statutory powers.

Uganda has already recognised the need for inter-agency coordination. The problem is that coordination without sufficient political weight, institutional capacity and case-tracking mechanisms can become another layer of bureaucracy.

What is required is a Cabinet-level political champion capable of asking, at every stage: What happened to this case? Who has it? What action was taken? What remains outstanding?

Redirecting The Catalyst

This is where the present campaign can become transformative. Balaam Barugahara and his active Cabinet colleagues have demonstrated the political power of visible accountability. Their interventions have shown that government can leave its offices, go to the field and confront failures that citizens have long complained about.

That political energy should not become another temporary campaign. It should become the catalyst for a national accountability architecture.

Indeed, if Government is persuaded that Hon. Balaam Barugahara’s fearlessness, activism and capacity to mobilise public attention are assets in the fight against corruption, there is an obvious way to deploy them beyond the district headquarters. He could be entrusted with the restored Cabinet portfolio for Ethics and Integrity, where that political energy could be brought to bear not merely on local officials but on the entire national accountability chain.

That would not make him a super-Minister. His role would be to provide political leadership and coordination, while the Inspectorate of Government, Auditor General, DPP, Police, Leadership Code Tribunal and other statutory institutions retain their independent mandates.

The same determination displayed at a district health centre should be applied to a central procurement agency. The same urgency brought to an abandoned road should be brought to a multi-billion-shilling infrastructure contract. The same question asked of a missing local worker should be asked of an unexplained payment at the centre.

Where did the money go? Who authorised it? Who benefited? Who knew? Who failed to act? And what happened after the red flag was raised? That is how Uganda can move from spectacle to statecraft.

The goal should not be to create a super-Minister who arrests, prosecutes and punishes. That would merely replace one institutional weakness with another form of executive overreach.

The goal is more ambitious: to create a political and institutional system in which no anti-corruption agency operates in isolation, no serious finding disappears without follow-up, and accountability reaches as confidently into the centre as it does into the districts.

Uganda does not need fewer anti-corruption institutions. It needs institutions that work together, institutions backed by political authority, and an accountability chain that reaches from the village project to the national procurement file. Do not extinguish the spark. Institutionalise it.

The writer is a senior advocate and former Minister

When committee leaders systematically abandon structured interrogation in favor of televised personal attacks and procedurally flawed fishing expeditions, they actively dismantle the credibility of the legislative process and signal to the public that personal political posturing matters far more than genuine statecraft.

This continuous drift by the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises is a stark reflection of that institutional failure. Rather than adhering strictly to the Auditor General reports and interrogating accounting officers on financial compliance, committee leadership repeatedly strays far beyond its constitutional boundary.

Just as previous leadership vulgarized the committee scope by prying into the private life, marriage, and personal background of Uganda Airlines CEO Jenifer Bamuturaki, Hon. Muwadda Nkunyingi is repeating the exact same procedural error with the Uganda Human Rights Commission.

Bypassing clear audit findings to chase internal administrative squabbles, matters already explicitly assigned by the Speaker to the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, is a reckless overreach that preempts sister committees while allowing a suffocating backlog of unreviewed audit reports to accumulate.

This persistent breakdown raises an urgent question regarding value for money and the taxpayer investment in these public officials. Citizens pay substantial public funds to maintain these lawmakers, complete with extensive technical support, allowances, and administrative backing.

Is the taxpayer getting any real return on investment when highly compensated representatives, guided by clear procedural frameworks, prove entirely incapable of reasoning logically within those established guidelines? It is baffling how individuals backed by such significant institutional resources continuously choose media antics over substantive oversight.

Are these members utterly uninducted on their legal scope, or are they consciously exploiting camera time to harvest cheap political capital because they fail to command the floor during plenary sessions? The quiet passivity of the technical staff makes the situation even worse.

Committee clerks and legal counsel are stationed in those chambers precisely to enforce the Rules of Procedure, keep proceedings grounded in empirical evidence, and prevent oversight from devolving into a media circus. When these highly paid technical experts remain silent while lawmakers dismantle statutory norms for personal visibility, the entire institutional framework fails the citizens who fund it.

The complaint, addressed to the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and copied to several senior government officials, asks the Inspectorate of Government to launch what it describes as an urgent investigation into the recruitment and continued employment of a one Ocen Jacob, who the complainants allege works as a Front Desk Officer at the Parliament of Uganda.

The petition alleges that Jacob is a former intelligence lieutenant with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and questions whether he possesses a valid Amnesty Certificate required under Uganda’s Amnesty Act. It also alleges that his recruitment into public service may not have complied with established public service procedures and that his qualifications should be independently verified.

However, the complaint itself does not provide documentary evidence proving the allegations, and, at the time of publication, none of the claims had been independently verified. The complaint was filed by Abba Advocates on behalf of unnamed clients described as concerned citizens and whistleblowers acting under Article 225 of the Constitution and the Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010.

The complainants requested that their identities remain confidential for now, citing fears of victimization. In the petition, the whistleblowers commend the Inspectorate of Government for recent anti-corruption enforcement actions involving officials at Parliament before arguing that accountability efforts should also extend to alleged beneficiaries of irregular recruitment into public service.

Allegations Raised

The complaint raises several issues it wants investigators to examine. First, it claims Jacob may not possess a valid Amnesty Certificate issued under the Amnesty Act, legislation that governs the reintegration of former rebels who renounce armed rebellion. The petition alleges that uncertainty surrounding his alleged amnesty status has generated concern within sections of the community, although it presents no official records from the Amnesty Commission supporting that claim.

Secondly, the complainants question whether Jacob met the minimum academic and professional qualifications required for employment in Parliament. The petition alleges that because of his purported involvement with the LRA during the insurgency in northern Uganda, investigators should verify the educational credentials and qualifications used during his recruitment.

The whistleblowers also ask investigators to establish whether the recruitment process complied with the Public Service Standing Orders and the Employment Act. In addition, the complaint requests an audit of Jacob’s payroll status, alleging that if his appointment was unlawful, public funds may have been improperly spent on his salary.

Security Concerns Raised

The petition further argues that, if the allegations regarding Jacob’s past are substantiated, his employment within Parliament would raise broader questions about vetting procedures for staff working in sensitive government institutions. The complainants contend that public confidence in state institutions depends on transparent recruitment processes and proper background checks for all public officers.

No evidence was attached to the complaint establishing that Parliament failed to conduct the necessary security vetting. The whistleblowers argue that the alleged conduct, if established, could amount to violations of several Ugandan laws, including the Constitution of Uganda regarding accountability and transparency in public service, the Leadership Code Act, the Public Service Standing Orders governing recruitment, the Amnesty Act and the Anti-Corruption Act.

Legal experts note that any determination of wrongdoing would depend on evidence gathered during an official investigation and cannot be presumed solely from the filing of a complaint. The complainants are asking the Inspectorate of Government to investigate the recruitment, appointment and payroll status of Jacob, to confirm with the Amnesty Commission whether he holds a valid Amnesty Certificate, verify his academic and professional qualifications, suspend salary payments if investigators discover irregularities and, recommend administrative, civil or criminal action against any individuals found responsible.

The petition also asks that the Inspectorate report its findings to Parliament and other relevant authorities.Copies of the complaint were addressed to the Speaker of Parliament, the Clerk to Parliament, the Inspector General of Police, the Chairperson of the Amnesty Commission, the Executive Director of the State House Anti-Corruption Unit and the Director General of the Internal Security Organisation.

As of publication, there was no public indication that any of the institutions had opened an investigation or reached findings regarding the allegations. Efforts to obtain a comment from Ocen Jacob, Parliament of Uganda, the Inspectorate of Government and the Amnesty Commission were futile as some didn’t pick there known telephone numbers and others were off every time we tried them.

The United States dollar funds were allegedly stolen from the office of Counsel Roberts Fridays Kagoro, while the Ugandan currency was reportedly stolen from the office of his co-managing partner, Counsel Frederick Jeremiah Muwema. Bizarrely, whereas fifteen police officers were present during the impugned exercise, the firm underscores that they did not bother to stop the violence, chaos and, criminal acts and impunity witnessed on that black day.

Instead, the police reportedly actively and directly participated in the commission of those crimes, benefitted from them, and supported, as well as encouraged on their alleged partners in crime.  The law firm explains that a lawyer company called Downtown Investments and its director, Puresh Kumar Ratital Mehta were the principal masterminds of the entire chaos.

They ostensibly acted alongside their lawyers, Rukia Adam, Ahmed Bongo and Fredrick Byatokoreire who are heavily blamed for reportedly abandoning their legal decorum to join armed goons in causing untold havoc, despite being officers of court and vanguards of due process.

Joining this park, the aggrieved law adds, was a security company known as A1 Security Systems. Together with the rest of the actors they allegedly ransacked the premises and dragged to the waiting get-away trucks confidential clients’ files, title documents and, valuable office equipment estimated at close to Ushs200 million.

The plaintiff emphasizes that whereas the actors concealed the impugned operation as merely a re-entry by the Downtown Investments, it was an illegal eviction conducted against the backdrop of a subsisting and ongoing court case. That original case had been filed by the company and it’s directors through their aforementioned lawyers, and it was intended to resolve the tenant-landlord lease-and-buy agreement status quo after the company claimed the tenant( Muwema and Company Advocates) had breached the contract and failed to pay rent.

The law illuminates that the security company was not legally permitted to participate in the operation – let alone considering it’s illegality- and yet the police and Downtown Investments lawyers supposedly simply looked on and just encouraged them as they reportedly broke all of the laws with reckless impunity. For the presumed illegal activities and negligence of the police officers present at the illegal operation, the law firm has joined the learned Attorney General  to the lawsuit to atone for their rogueness and unprofessionalism, crimes, and illegalities in damages.

In a recap, the law firm – now comfortably settled in the leafy Upper Nakasero part of Kampala Capital City- want all of the cited defendants to foot the cost with Ushs12 billion, excluding the legal fees to be quantified following the conclusion of the lawsuit. The defendants are legally expected to file their respective defenses within 15 days of being served with the necessary court process in regards to this lawsuit. We shall keep you posted about all of the breaking developments related to this matter.  Stay well and take care.