“Et tu, Brute?” — “You too, Brutus?” Those immortal words, attributed to Julius Caesar in William Shakespeare’s tragedy, capture the agony of betrayal by a trusted friend. Caesar could understand the hostility of his political enemies. What he could not easily comprehend was that one of the men participating in his downfall was Brutus, someone he considered a friend and ally.

In politics, however, friendship is not always a guarantee of loyalty, and loyalty is not always what it appears to be. Sometimes, the most effective weapon against a powerful man is not an enemy standing outside his palace but a trusted associate whispering into his ear.

That is the question now hanging over the increasingly combustible political atmosphere surrounding Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the man widely perceived as President Museveni’s potential successor, and Andrew Mwenda, the outspoken veteran journalist and political commentator who has cultivated a close relationship with him.

Is Mwenda merely warning Muhoozi about genuine security threats, or could his interventions, however well-intentioned, be reinforcing the very suspicions that isolate the CDF from other members of the ruling establishment? And, in a more uncomfortable interpretation, could the people who fear Muhoozi’s eventual dominance be benefiting from the counsel of a man he trusts?

These are questions, not established facts. There is no verified evidence that Mwenda is deliberately working to undermine Muhoozi or that members of the ruling establishment have recruited him for such a purpose. But the political theatre unfolding around the CDF invites an examination of how power, fear, friendship and succession struggles can become dangerously intertwined.

The Brutus analogy

Julius Caesar did not fall because he lacked military victories, political influence or loyal followers. He fell because his extraordinary concentration of power frightened sections of Rome’s political elite.

Some senators feared that Caesar’s elevation to perpetual dictatorship would extinguish the republican institutions through which they exercised influence. Others had personal grievances, political ambitions and reasons to resent his supremacy.

Brutus became the moral centre of the conspiracy because his participation gave the assassins a veneer of republican virtue. If even Brutus believed Caesar had become too powerful, the conspirators could portray their actions as a defence of Rome rather than a struggle for power.

Yet the assassination did not restore the republic to stability. It unleashed further civil wars and ultimately helped pave the way for imperial rule under Augustus. That is the great irony of political conspiracies: those who claim to be saving a system can end up destroying it.

Uganda’s circumstances are different, and there is no basis for equating the current confrontation with Caesar’s assassination. Nevertheless, the analogy offers a useful lens through which to examine the politics of succession.

Muhoozi occupies an unusually sensitive position. He is the serving military chief, the son of the President and a political figure whose supporters openly discuss his future presidential ambitions. His position gives him influence, but it also places him at the centre of competing interests within the establishment.

Those who support his rise may want to accelerate it. Those who fear his dominance may prefer to contain it. Others may simply wish to preserve their own influence regardless of who eventually occupies State House. In such an environment, a trusted adviser can become more consequential than an open opponent. The danger is that an adviser who constantly warns a powerful man about betrayal may eventually convince him that betrayal is everywhere.

Mwenda and the Elwelu affair

The latest episode began with the public confrontation between Muhoozi and retired Lt Gen Peter Elwelu, a former Deputy Chief of Defence Forces whose military career was closely associated with some of Uganda’s most controversial security operations.

In a post attributed to Mwenda on X, he has alleged that Elwelu had been planning to kill Muhoozi and had recruited a militia whose members were briefed that eliminating the CDF would enable Elwelu to take over Uganda. Mwenda further claimed that the retired general was hiding in the swamps of Teso. These are grave allegations. They should be treated as allegations until independently established by credible evidence and tested through lawful proceedings.

Muhoozi, meanwhile, announced that security forces had seized additional guns and ammunition allegedly hidden at different locations, arrested Elwelu’s driver and impounded a vehicle he said the fugitive had been using. He also warned that anyone assisting Elwelu would face serious consequences.

In another message, Muhoozi said he has instructed soldiers not to kill Elwelu but to bring him to him alive because he wanted to talk to him. That declaration presents two competing images of the CDF. One is of a commander determined to dismantle what he describes as treachery. The other is of a powerful military chief personally intervening in a matter involving a retired senior officer, raising questions about due process, institutional discipline and the appropriate handling of criminal allegations.

The public has yet to see sufficient independently verified evidence to settle every claim circulating around the dispute. The distinction between an intelligence allegation, a military assertion and a fact established in court is therefore essential. But the political implications extend beyond the fate of one retired general.

Elwelu is not an ordinary figure in Uganda’s military history. He rose through the ranks, commanded Ugandan troops deployed to Somalia and later became associated with the November 2016 raid on the Rwenzururu royal palace in Kasese, in which more than 150 people were reported killed.

His defenders may emphasise his military service, while critics point to the deaths in Kasese and his human rights record. In May 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on him over alleged human rights abuses. His retirement did not erase that history, nor did it eliminate his right to due process.

The present confrontation therefore combines a serious security allegation, a controversial military legacy and a succession environment in which almost every dramatic development can acquire a political meaning. That is precisely why caution is necessary.

The danger of becoming Caesar’s Brutus

The provocative question is not whether Mwenda is literally Brutus. It is whether the role he is playing in this unfolding drama could produce consequences contrary to Muhoozi’s interests. A trusted friend who repeatedly supplies alarming intelligence, interprets disagreements as conspiracies and identifies supposed enemies may believe he is protecting the person he advises.

But if the advice encourages that person to distrust family members, alienate senior colleagues and treat political disagreement as evidence of treason, the adviser may inadvertently help create the isolation that makes the leader vulnerable. This is the Brutus paradox. Brutus believed Caesar’s power posed a danger to Rome. His intervention, however, did not save the republic from the consequences of concentrated power. It plunged Rome into a more destructive struggle.

In Uganda’s case, one cannot responsibly conclude that Mwenda has a hidden assignment to destroy Muhoozi. Nor is there evidence establishing that the CDF is deliberately being manipulated by an organised inner-circle conspiracy. But it is reasonable to ask whether the language of betrayal is becoming too dominant in the political conversation surrounding the military chief.

When every former colleague is potentially a traitor, every disagreement becomes a security threat and every independent voice is treated as an enemy, the leader risks losing the very relationships that could protect him from poor decisions. The most dangerous adviser is not necessarily the one who openly opposes a leader. It may be the one whose loyalty is so unquestioned that the leader stops questioning the advice.

Besiita politics and the fear of a powerful heir

Every succession project creates its own anxieties. The closer a potential heir comes to power, the more nervous the people around him can become.

The people who helped build the incumbent’s political system may welcome the prospect of continuity while fearing that the successor will eventually dismantle the networks that made his rise possible. This is where the metaphor of the Basiita — members of the inner circle of President Museveni who operate close to the centre of power — becomes politically useful.

Imagine a group of influential insiders who believe Muhoozi, if allowed to accumulate too much power, could become an Ugandan Caesar: a ruler whose authority eventually overwhelms the interests of those who helped elevate him. Their dilemma would be straightforward. They may want Muhoozi to succeed Museveni, but not necessarily to become powerful enough to govern without their consent.

They might support his succession in principle while quietly worrying about what his presidency would mean for their positions, businesses, political influence and access to State House. Such fears are not unique to Uganda. Political heirs frequently discover that the people who celebrate their rise are not always comfortable with their independence.

The temptation, therefore, would be to manage the heir: influence his perceptions, control the information reaching him and encourage decisions that make him dependent on a small circle of trusted advisers. But this remains a political hypothesis, not a proven account of what is happening around Muhoozi. There is no independently established evidence that a group of insiders is orchestrating the Elwelu confrontation to undermine the CDF.

The point is that succession politics rewards suspicion, and suspicion can be cultivated without a grand conspiracy. A leader can be weakened simply by being encouraged to fight too many battles simultaneously.

The Besigye militia narrative: intelligence or political ammunition?

Mwenda’s reported references to Dr Kizza Besigye provide another illustration of the power of security narratives in Uganda’s political history. In the account supplied in the current controversy, Besigye allegedly wanted to overthrow President Museveni, recruited a militia and arranged training in the Mombasa area.

The account further alleges that Besigye travelled to Switzerland with his close political allies Salaamu Musumba, Obedi Lutale and others to purchase arms from a dealer identified as Orlando.

These claims require documentary corroboration and independent verification before they can be presented as established facts. Their significance here is the political function such allegations can perform when introduced into a succession debate.

The allegation of a militia is not merely an accusation against an individual. It can transform political opposition into a question of national security. Once a political opponent is portrayed as someone preparing armed violence, ordinary questions about democratic competition, accountability and political legitimacy can be pushed aside. That is why the provenance of intelligence matters. Who supplied the information? What documents, witnesses or physical evidence support it? Was it independently investigated? Were the allegations tested in court? What did the accused say in response?

These questions are not signs of sympathy for political violence. They are the minimum requirements of responsible public discourse. In the current confrontation, the same discipline should apply to claims that Elwelu recruited a militia to kill Muhoozi. If the allegations are true, the public deserves credible evidence and a lawful investigation. If they are exaggerated, misunderstood or false, the consequences of acting on them could be equally serious. The danger arises when allegations become political weapons before they become established facts.

Political intelligence

The irony is that political intelligence does not always mean understanding the game being played. Sometimes it means recognising when one is being drawn into a game whose rules and objectives have been set by someone else.

If Muhoozi believes that every threat reported to him requires an immediate confrontation, he risks allowing other people’s allegations to dictate his priorities. If he treats every former military colleague as a potential enemy, he may gradually lose the institutional relationships needed to manage a complicated security environment.

If he interprets political distance as proof of conspiracy, he could find himself increasingly dependent on the very few people who assure him that they alone understand the danger. And if those advisers are wrong, the consequences will not be borne by them alone. They will be borne by the institution he commands, the political movement associated with his name and, ultimately, the country.

That is why the declaration that Elwelu must be brought alive deserves more than a dramatic reading. It should be accompanied by a clear commitment to lawful custody, independent investigation and transparent proceedings. A commander who wants to establish his authority does not need to demonstrate that he can personally settle every dispute. Sometimes, the strongest demonstration of authority is allowing institutions to do their work without fear or favour.

Has Muhoozi been separated from his own family?

Another concern raised in the political speculation is the possibility that Muhoozi could become increasingly isolated from people within the first family, including Odrek Rwabwogo, who is married to his sister Patience Museveni.

There is, however, no verified evidence presented here establishing that Mwenda or any other individual has deliberately engineered a rupture between them. Political differences, family disagreements and competing interests should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of a coordinated plot. Nevertheless, the broader principle is worth considering.

In politics, isolation is rarely achieved in a single dramatic act. It can happen incrementally, as a leader becomes suspicious of one associate, quarrels with another and eventually concludes that only a narrow circle can be trusted. The process can be self-reinforcing. The more isolated the leader becomes, the more dependent he is on the people who remain close to him. The more dependent he becomes, the harder it is to challenge their advice.

That is how a relationship built on friendship can evolve into a system of informational dependence. The friend becomes the interpreter of events. The interpreter becomes the gatekeeper of information. The gatekeeper gradually shapes the leader’s understanding of who is loyal and who is dangerous. There is no need to imagine a secret meeting in a dark room for this process to occur. It can emerge from personal loyalties, shared anxieties and the ordinary incentives of life around power.

The real lesson of Caesar’s death

Caesar’s assassination is often remembered as a story of betrayal. But it is also a story of political miscalculation. The conspirators believed that removing one man would resolve their fears about the future of Rome. Instead, they triggered a struggle that devastated the republic they claimed to defend.

Brutus discovered that noble intentions, even when sincerely held, do not guarantee wise political outcomes. The lesson for Muhoozi is not that Mwenda is a traitor, that Elwelu is innocent or that an inner-circle conspiracy has been established. None of those conclusions follows from the information available.

It is that power attracts competing interests, and those interests do not always announce themselves honestly. The CDF must therefore distinguish between evidence and interpretation, between a credible security threat and a politically convenient accusation, and between a friend who offers sound advice and one whose certainty may exceed the available facts. He must also recognise that the military institution he commands cannot become an instrument for resolving personal suspicions or succession rivalries.

Elwelu, for his part, must answer any credible criminal allegations through lawful processes. His controversial history does not make him guilty of every new accusation, just as his retirement does not place him beyond investigation. Mwenda, meanwhile, has the freedom to scrutinise security threats and offer political analysis. But with that freedom comes a responsibility to distinguish what he can substantiate from what he merely suspects. The stakes are too high for social media declarations to substitute for evidence.

Who benefits if Muhoozi loses trust in everyone?

This is the question at the heart of the Brutus metaphor. If Muhoozi becomes embroiled in confrontations with former commanders, estranged from influential relatives and increasingly suspicious of political colleagues, who benefits from that environment?

The answer cannot responsibly be supplied without evidence. Different actors may benefit from different developments, and some may simply be responding to events rather than orchestrating them. But the question deserves attention because political power is rarely exercised in a vacuum. Every conflict changes the balance of influence, sometimes in ways that favour people who did not initiate it.

A leader consumed by internal battles has less time to build alliances, articulate a national programme or establish the institutional credibility required for higher office. A leader who appears unpredictable can frighten potential allies.

And a leader who allows personal loyalty to replace verifiable evidence may eventually discover that the people closest to him have become indispensable precisely because he has alienated everyone else. That is the ultimate danger of the Brutus script: the possibility that a man who believes he is defending himself against betrayal is being encouraged, deliberately or otherwise, to make decisions that deepen his vulnerability.

Whether Mwenda’s interventions are helping or hurting Muhoozi can only be judged by examining their substance, accuracy and consequences. Friendship alone cannot settle the question. Nor should every inconvenient adviser be suspected of conspiracy. Sometimes a friend is simply wrong. Sometimes a warning is justified. And sometimes political actors interpret the same events differently because they have different interests. The responsibility of leadership is to test those interpretations rather than surrender to the most dramatic one.

Enter Iago: The trusted friend who poisons the mind

If Brutus provides the analogy of a friend who betrays a powerful leader in the name of saving the republic, William Shakespeare’s Othello offers an even more sinister character for Uganda’s unfolding political theatre: Iago.

Iago does not confront Othello, the Moor of Venice, through open warfare. He does something more calculated. He exploits Othello’s trust, feeds him carefully constructed suspicions and manipulates his interpretation of events until the general becomes convinced that his beloved wife, Desdemona, has betrayed him.

Othello possesses military authority, enjoys social standing and trusts Iago as an experienced subordinate and confidant. Yet that trust becomes the instrument of his destruction. Iago does not need to defeat Othello on the battlefield. He merely needs to control the story Othello believes about the people closest to him. By planting doubts about Desdemona’s fidelity and presenting insinuations as evidence, Iago turns Othello against his innocent wife. Tragically, Othello kills Desdemona, only to discover the deception after the damage has been done.

The tragedy is not simply that Iago lies. It is that Othello comes to treat the lies as truth because they are delivered by someone he trusts. This is where the Iago analogy becomes particularly relevant to the political speculation surrounding Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba and Andrew Mwenda.

The question is not whether Mwenda is Iago; there is no established evidence that he is deliberately manipulating Muhoozi. Rather, the literary parallel invites us to consider what happens when a powerful man increasingly depends on a trusted associate to interpret the intentions of everyone around him.

What if the warnings intended to protect a leader instead deepen his suspicions? What if allegations about colleagues, former commanders or relatives begin to shape his relationships before the evidence has been independently tested? What if the trusted adviser becomes the principal narrator of who is loyal, who is dangerous and who must be confronted? These are the ingredients of an Iago-like political tragedy, whether the process results from deliberate manipulation, genuine but mistaken suspicions or the ordinary distortions of life around power.

In Shakespeare’s play, Iago understands that Othello’s trust is the gateway through which suspicion can enter. In politics, the equivalent danger arises when a leader allows one person’s interpretation of events to become the unquestioned account of reality. The adviser need not invent every allegation. Sometimes, selecting which facts to emphasise, which rumours to repeat and which relationships to portray as threatening can be enough to influence a leader’s decisions. And once suspicion takes hold, the leader may begin to supply the rest of the plot himself.

From Desdemona to the inner circle

Othello’s tragedy also demonstrates the collateral damage that follows when a leader acts on untested suspicions. Desdemona becomes the victim of a deception she did not create and could not successfully overcome. In political life, the equivalent casualties may be family relationships, professional alliances, institutional credibility and the confidence of people who might otherwise have remained loyal.

That is why the reported possibility of Muhoozi becoming estranged from influential members of the first family, including his brother-in-law Odrek Rwabwogo, must be approached carefully. There is no verified evidence here establishing that Mwenda engineered such a separation. But the wider question of how suspicion can erode relationships remains pertinent.

A leader surrounded by competing interests needs advisers who challenge his assumptions, test allegations and distinguish between genuine threats and ordinary disagreements. He does not benefit from an atmosphere in which every disagreement is interpreted as evidence of betrayal. The difference between a responsible adviser and a Shakespearean Iago is not simply the language each uses. It is the relationship each has with evidence, uncertainty and the leader’s independence of judgement.

Brutus and Iago: Two routes to a leader’s downfall

Brutus and Iago represent different forms of betrayal. Brutus participates in Caesar’s assassination because he believes Caesar’s concentration of power threatens Rome, although personal and political considerations also complicate his motives. Iago, meanwhile, manipulates Othello through calculated deception and jealousy.

One presents betrayal as a sacrifice for the public good. The other disguises malice behind the appearance of loyal service. Applied to the Muhoozi controversy, these are literary warnings, not findings about Mwenda’s intentions or the existence of an organised conspiracy.

The Brutus question is whether people around a potential successor might fear his eventual power and seek to constrain him. The Iago question is whether a trusted adviser’s warnings, if inaccurate or selectively presented, could cause the successor to damage his own relationships and judgement. Both analogies lead to the same institutional lesson: a powerful leader should never confuse personal trust with proof, or the confidence of an adviser with the reliability of the information being supplied.

Beware the friend who knows every enemy

In Shakespeare’s tragedy, Caesar’s trust in Brutus becomes part of the tragedy of his final moments. In Uganda’s succession drama, the comparison serves as a warning rather than a verdict. Muhoozi may face genuine security threats. Elwelu may have questions to answer. Mwenda may sincerely believe that his warnings are necessary. The ruling establishment may contain competing interests. None of these possibilities, standing alone, proves that a coordinated plot exists.

But one principle remains: a leader can survive criticism from his enemies more easily than he can survive a distorted understanding of reality supplied by his trusted friends. If Muhoozi is to secure his political future, he must avoid becoming a prisoner of suspicion. He needs evidence, independent institutional advice, reliable relationships and the confidence to distinguish disagreement from treachery.

If Mwenda is genuinely acting in Muhoozi’s interests, his greatest service would be to insist on facts, due process and measured judgement rather than allow every allegation to become another chapter in a drama of betrayal. And if members of the inner circle fear that Muhoozi could become a Caesar, the answer is not to manufacture enemies or manipulate the heir. It is to build institutions strong enough to constrain power whoever eventually occupies State House.

For, as Rome learned too late, removing or weakening a powerful man does not automatically save a republic. Sometimes, the people who claim to be protecting the system merely prepare the ground for a greater crisis. And sometimes, the most consequential question is not whether Brutus is holding a dagger. It is whether Caesar has begun to believe that everyone around him is.

Now, reports that she was among those arrested during a raid on her husband’s home have brought renewed attention to the world champion whose rise was built on determination and discipline.

For years, Apolot made her name by taking on opponents in the ring, exchanging punches and kicks with fighters who stood between her and championship titles. Her career took her from the modest surroundings of Ngora District in eastern Uganda to international competitions, where she won recognition as one of the country’s leading female kickboxers.

But this week, the spotlight shifted from her sporting achievements to her private life after Chief of Defence Forces Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba reportedly announced that security personnel had captured about 20 escorts attached to retired Lt Gen Peter Elwelu, including Apolot, during a raid on the former general’s home.

The reported arrest has raised questions about the circumstances surrounding the operation and the position of a celebrated sportswoman married to a senior military officer whose career has become associated with some of Uganda’s most controversial security operations.

The circumstances of Apolot’s reported detention, the allegations against those arrested and whether she faces any charges require clarification from the relevant authorities. Her reported presence at the residence does not, by itself, establish wrongdoing.

For a woman whose public identity was built around sporting excellence, the development has placed her in an unfamiliar kind of contest: one fought not under the lights of a sporting arena, but amid the uncertainty surrounding her husband’s military troubles.

From Ngora to the international stage

Born on November 6, 1990, to Josephine Aujo and Emmanuel Mukula, Apolot grew up in Ngora, in the Teso sub-region of eastern Uganda. She spent much of her childhood under the care of her maternal great-grandmother, an upbringing that preceded her eventual emergence as an internationally recognised martial artist.

Her early life was not a straightforward journey towards professional sport. Like many young Ugandans trying to identify a career path, she explored different opportunities before finding a discipline in which she could distinguish herself.

Apolot attended St Aloysius Primary School from 1996 to 2002 before joining Teso Integrated Secondary School. She completed her Ordinary Level studies in 2006 and her Advanced Level education in 2008.

After completing school, she relocated to Kampala to live with her mother. The move exposed her to a wider range of opportunities, but it also marked the beginning of a period of experimentation as she searched for a profession that suited her ambitions.

She explored vocational pursuits and considered different careers, including police training. Football became one of her serious interests, and she played for Proline Football Academy for nearly two years.

Her involvement in football reportedly took her to a high competitive level, including appearances in matches involving Uganda’s national team. It was a promising route, but it was not the one that would ultimately make her famous.

In 2010, Apolot turned to boxing. Three years later, she moved into kickboxing, a combat sport that combines punching techniques with kicks and demands considerable physical conditioning, timing, balance and tactical awareness. By 2014, she had turned professional.

The transition required more than physical strength. Professional combat sports demand a willingness to train repeatedly, absorb setbacks and return to competition against opponents who are equally determined to win. For Apolot, the ring became a platform on which she could build a name beyond her home district.

Her nickname, the “Black Pearl”, would become associated with her identity as a Ugandan female fighter competing for national and international honours.

The making of the Black Pearl

Apolot’s rise gathered momentum in 2014 when she successfully defended her national kickboxing title against Jackie Nassimbwa. The victory helped establish her as a leading contender in Uganda’s female combat-sports scene.

Her defining breakthrough came on June 27, 2015, in Dunaújváros, Hungary, where she defeated Serbia’s Ivana Mirkov to win the World Kickboxing Federation international lightweight title.

The achievement placed Apolot among the Ugandan women who had demonstrated that local athletes could compete successfully on the international stage. She was no longer simply a promising fighter from Teso; she was a champion with a title to defend.

Later that year, she returned to Hungary to defend her international standing against Anita Nagy, then a Hungarian champion. Apolot won by technical knockout in November 2015, reinforcing her reputation as a determined and effective competitor.

These victories formed the foundation of the “Black Pearl” identity. Her career was built around preparation, aggression within the rules of the sport and the ability to maintain composure under pressure.

Kickboxing is an unusual career choice in a society where women in competitive sport can face pressure to pursue more conventional paths. Apolot’s decision to enter the ring, and then turn professional, required her to establish herself in an environment where physical toughness and confidence are central to success.

Her experience also offered a different image of a young woman from eastern Uganda: not merely someone seeking opportunities in Kampala, but an athlete capable of representing her country abroad.

Recognition at State House

Apolot’s sporting accomplishments eventually brought her into contact with Uganda’s highest political office.

On a reported courtesy visit to President Yoweri Museveni at State House, Entebbe, she presented some of the championship belts she had won during her career. Dressed in a black-and-white striped outfit, she discussed the progress and promotion of kickboxing with the President.

The visit reflected the public recognition she had earned through her achievements. For an athlete whose career had begun after experimenting with football and other pursuits, presenting her belts to the Head of State represented a significant moment.

It also highlighted the potential of combat sports to provide opportunities for young Ugandans beyond conventional employment.

Yet sporting recognition does not necessarily translate into sustained institutional support. Athletes need training facilities, qualified coaches, sponsorship, international competition opportunities and reliable funding to maintain their careers.

Apolot’s meeting with Museveni brought attention to those issues, although the available account does not establish what specific commitments, if any, followed the discussion.

Her championship record nevertheless remains an important part of her public identity. Before the current controversy surrounding her marriage, she was known principally as a fighter who had carried Uganda’s flag into international competition.

The marriage that drew attention

Apolot’s personal life attracted a different kind of interest when she married Elwelu, a senior UPDF officer whose career had taken him through some of the most consequential military operations in Uganda’s recent history.

The supplied biographical account places their marriage at about 2016, when Apolot was in her mid-twenties and Elwelu was already an established military commander.

Their reported age difference of 24 years has become a talking point following the events at Elwelu’s home. But the age gap alone cannot explain the relationship or establish what drew the two together.

How does a successful young athlete decide to marry a man who belongs to a markedly different generation and whose professional life has been shaped by military command?

It is a compelling question, but one that cannot responsibly be answered by assuming that Apolot was attracted to his rank, wealth, authority or reputation

What can be said is that Apolot had established an independent public identity before becoming widely discussed as Elwelu’s wife. Her sporting career involved its own ambitions, achievements and challenges.

Her marriage subsequently connected her to a man whose name was already associated with Uganda’s military establishment, bringing a different dimension to her public profile.

For a woman in her twenties marrying a man with decades of military experience, the relationship would naturally attract public curiosity. But the more important question is how the couple navigated their private life away from public attention.

That question has become particularly pertinent following Gen Muhoozi’s allegations about the relationship.

The Elwelu controversy: A marriage under the shadow of Kasese

To understand why Apolot’s marriage has attracted renewed public interest, it is necessary to examine the military career of her husband and the controversies that have followed him.

Elwelu rose through the ranks of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), eventually serving as Deputy Chief of Defence Forces between 2021 and 2024. He was also appointed a senior presidential adviser on Teso and Karamoja affairs and represented the army in Parliament.

His name, however, is particularly associated with the November 2016 security operation in Kasese, where the army and police raided the offices and palace of the Rwenzururu Kingdom, led by King Charles Wesley Mumbere.

At the time, Elwelu was a brigadier general commanding the army’s Second Division. He was among the senior commanders associated with the operation, which followed prolonged tensions between the government and the kingdom over its royal guards and security incidents in the region. The operation left scores dead and resulted in the arrest of Mumbere and many of his subjects.

The International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor later reported credible information that multiple killings had been committed by Ugandan security forces during the events of November 26 and 27, 2016. Human Rights Watch has also called for an independent investigation into the killings.

In May 2024, the United States announced travel sanctions against Elwelu, citing extrajudicial killings committed by members of the UPDF under his command. The sanctions did not amount to a criminal conviction, but they added an international dimension to the controversy surrounding his military record.

For Apolot, who was a young professional athlete around the time of the Kasese operation, marriage to a man with such a public profile meant becoming connected to a military career that carried both senior institutional responsibilities and considerable controversy.

Muhoozi’s allegations and the reported arrest

The immediate trigger for renewed scrutiny of Apolot came on Monday, when Gen Muhoozi announced on X that security personnel had arrested Elwelu’s wife alongside more than 20 former soldiers associated with the retired general.

In his post, the CDF alleged that Apolot had been physically abusing her husband for eight years. He described the allegation as domestic abuse. The claim was reported by Pulse Uganda, which noted that the allegations had not been independently verified.

The allegation introduced a startling new dimension to the public story of the couple. Elwelu, a former senior military commander whose career was built around authority and command, was now being portrayed by the army chief as a victim of alleged abuse within his marriage.

However, a social media statement is not a substitute for independently established facts. The circumstances of the alleged abuse, the evidence supporting the accusation and the legal basis for Apolot’s reported detention were not established in the reports available at the time.

It is also necessary to distinguish between an arrest and a finding of guilt. Apolot is entitled to due process, and any allegation against her should be examined through the appropriate legal procedures.

The CDF’s public remarks also raise questions about how sensitive military matters and allegations involving family relationships should be handled. Those questions are especially significant because the people involved include a serving army chief and a retired officer who once held one of the military’s highest positions.

The reported arrest also occurred amid a broader confrontation over Elwelu’s whereabouts and military status.

A champion whose story is bigger than the controversy

Before her name became associated with the troubles surrounding Elwelu, Apolot had established a record that deserves to be considered on its own terms.

Her journey from Ngora to international kickboxing competitions demonstrated the possibilities available to a young Ugandan woman willing to pursue an unconventional sporting career.

Her early experiences were not without obstacles. In a 2015 media interview, Apolot discussed the challenges faced by female fighters, including limited sponsorship, inadequate institutional support and the difficulties of training in environments dominated by men. Those challenges are central to understanding her career. Success in combat sports requires physical conditioning, technical ability and sustained investment in training. For women, the challenge can be compounded by limited access to funding and recognition.

Apolot nevertheless persevered, won national honours and secured an international title in Hungary. Her achievements provided a source of pride for Ugandan sport and helped demonstrate that female athletes could compete beyond the continent.

The contrast between that career and the current controversy is stark. A woman once recognised for presenting championship belts at State House is now in the headlines because of allegations involving her marriage and a military dispute.

But neither her sporting accomplishments nor the allegations against her should predetermine how the public understands her.

If authorities have credible evidence of wrongdoing, the matter should be investigated fairly. If the allegations cannot be substantiated, that too should become clear through an appropriate process. Until then, speculation about her motives, character or role in her husband’s troubles risks obscuring the facts.

The same principle applies to Elwelu. His military record, including the unresolved questions surrounding the Kasese killings, should be assessed through evidence and accountable institutions rather than through personal attacks or social media declarations.

For Apolot, the immediate questions are practical: Where is she being held, what are the grounds for her reported arrest, has she been formally charged, and has she been given access to legal representation?

Ultimately, Patricia “Black Pearl” Apolot’s life contains two distinct stories. The first is that of a young woman from Ngora who found her calling in a demanding sport and rose to international recognition. The second is that of a champion whose private life has become entangled in a highly public military controversy.

The controversy erupted after Igara East MP Michael Mawanda said he had received Justice Singiza at the Office of the National Chairman in Nakasero on a courtesy call.

In a social media post, Mr Mawanda said Justice Singiza “warmly endorsed” Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba for president, describing the endorsement as “a powerful affirmation” of a vision they shared for a stronger and more just nation.

The reported endorsement immediately triggered an uproar among lawyers, opposition politicians and members of the public, who questioned how the chairperson of a body responsible for recruiting, supervising and disciplining judicial officers could openly associate himself with the political ambitions of a serving military commander. Opposition National Unity Platform president Bobi Wine was among the most outspoken critics.

“Uganda’s justice system hits a new low with the head of the Judicial Service Commission Singiza Douglas openly endorsing Museveni’s brutal, criminal son,” Mr Wine said.

He questioned how the JSC could enforce the Judicial Code of Conduct against other judicial officers who engage in partisan politics when its own chairperson was allegedly engaging in political mobilisation.

Other critics raised a similar concern: that a litigant appearing before a judicial officer supervised by the JSC may reasonably question whether that officer can act independently if the person supervising judicial discipline is publicly identified with a presidential candidate.

The controversy is particularly significant because the JSC is not an ordinary government department. It is an independent constitutional body established under Article 146 of the Constitution and is mandated to advise on the appointment and disciplinary control of senior judicial officers, receive complaints concerning the Judiciary and act as a link between the people and the courts.

The JSC’s own public description says its mandate includes recruiting judicial officers, regulating their conduct and strengthening judicial integrity. That mandate puts its chairperson at the centre of Uganda’s judicial accountability system.

What does the law say?

The legal question surrounding Justice Singiza is not simply whether a citizen is entitled to have political opinions. It is whether a serving judicial officer — particularly one heading the constitutional body responsible for judicial discipline — can publicly participate in political activity without undermining the independence and impartiality expected of the judicial office.

The provision contained in the document supplied with this story is Section 16 of the Political Parties and Organisations Act.

It provides that a member of the UPDF, police, prisons service, a public officer, traditional or cultural leader or a person employed by a government-owned company shall not be a founder, promoter or member of a political party or organisation, hold office in a political party or organisation, speak publicly or publish material involving political-party controversy, or engage in canvassing in support of a political party, organisation or candidate.

A person who contravenes the provision commits an offence and may face a fine of up to 24 currency points, imprisonment for up to one year, or both. A currency point under the Act is Shs20,000. However, there is an important legal distinction.

Section 16 does not expressly use the words “judge” or “judicial officer”. Whether the provision’s definition of “public officer” directly encompasses a judicial officer would require legal interpretation because the Act defines public service in terms of services rendered in a civil capacity of government or local government.

The more direct provision is found in the Uganda Code of Judicial Conduct, incorporated into the Administration of the Judiciary (Judiciary Service) Regulations, 2025.

Regulation 4.6 states that a judicial officer “shall refrain from all active political activity or involvement” and from conduct which, in the mind of a reasonable, fair-minded and informed person, might create the appearance that the judicial officer is engaged in political activity.

Regulation 4.4 further requires a judicial officer to avoid conduct or associations that could undermine public confidence in the officer’s impartiality in relation to matters that may come before the courts.

The same Code says judicial office is a public trust and requires judicial officers to protect judicial independence and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The Constitution reinforces the principle.

Article 128 provides that courts must be independent and not subject to the control or direction of any person or authority. It also prohibits interference with courts or judicial officers in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Article 149 requires every judicial officer to take the judicial oath. Under that oath, a judicial officer promises to exercise judicial functions and do right to all people in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Uganda “without fear or favour, affection or ill will.”

It is therefore the appearance of impartiality, as much as actual impartiality, that makes the current controversy particularly sensitive.

The JSC’s extraordinary position

The JSC’s constitutional role makes the controversy more serious than a political statement by an ordinary public servant.

Under Article 147, the Commission advises the President on appointments and disciplinary control involving the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, Principal Judge, Supreme Court justices, Court of Appeal justices and High Court judges. It also performs appointment and disciplinary functions for other judicial officers.

The Judicial Service Act makes the chairperson the head of the Commission, responsible for its administration and for monitoring and supervising the Secretary.

The Commission itself says it exists to foster an accountable and effective Judiciary through competence-based recruitment, disciplinary control and stakeholder engagement.

Consequently, critics argue that the issue is not merely whether Singiza has personally chosen a preferred presidential candidate.

The question is whether a person occupying the highest leadership position in the judicial disciplinary machinery can publicly identify with a political campaign without damaging confidence in the institution he leads.

Dan Wandera Ogalo, a lawyer, has questioned whether Singiza could be unaware of the constitutional and ethical restrictions governing judicial officers.

Others pointed to the practical dilemma created by his position: a judicial officer facing disciplinary proceedings is ultimately subject to a system in which Singiza is the chairperson.

A judge whose career has repeatedly attracted controversy

The latest controversy adds to a career in which Justice Singiza has repeatedly found himself at the centre of politically sensitive cases.

Singiza joined the Judiciary in 1994 as a magistrate and steadily rose through the ranks. He served at Nakawa and later became Chief Magistrate at Buganda Road Court.

He was also involved in the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, first as assistant secretary for research and later as secretary. In 2018, the Judiciary identified him among the newly appointed chief magistrates.

His academic career was equally substantial. He holds a Bachelor of Laws from Makerere University, a master’s degree in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa from the University of Pretoria and a doctorate in Public Law from the University of the Western Cape. His academic work has focused on decentralisation, federalism and governance.

In April 2022, President Museveni appointed him to serve as an acting High Court judge. The appointment followed vetting and interviews by the Judicial Service Commission.

The Judicial Service Commission’s own annual report lists Singiza among judicial officers appointed to the High Court during the 2021/22 financial year.

He later became a substantive High Court judge before being appointed chairperson of the JSC in 2025.

The Kakwenza controversy

One of Singiza’s earliest high-profile controversies arose from his handling of the case involving novelist Kakwenza Rukirabashaija. Kakwenza was arrested in December 2021 after posting comments about President Museveni and then-Lt Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba. He later appeared before Singiza at Buganda Road Court.

Kakwenza alleged that he had been abducted, tortured and held incommunicado by security personnel before being brought to court.

In February 2022, Singiza rejected Kakwenza’s application to have his passport returned so that he could travel abroad for specialised medical treatment. The magistrate held that his condition could be managed in Ugandan medical facilities and said the court had not been presented with witnesses proving that he had been tortured.

Medical documents presented by Kakwenza’s lawyers reportedly showed multiple injuries, including bruises, lacerations and other injuries.

Kakwenza subsequently petitioned the Judicial Service Commission accusing Singiza of professional misconduct, alleging that the magistrate had ignored his condition and failed to act on his torture allegations.

Those were allegations by Kakwenza, not findings that Singiza committed misconduct. There is no basis to state as established fact that Singiza “covered up” torture, as some of his political critics now allege.

Besigye and the 2025 ruling

Singiza later presided over politically sensitive proceedings involving opposition figure Dr Kizza Besigye.

In February 2025, he dismissed a habeas corpus application brought by Besigye and another applicant. The case concerned the legality of their continued detention following developments surrounding the military court proceedings.

The judgment attracted fierce criticism from Besigye’s supporters. Singiza, in an unusually pointed portion of his ruling, also addressed social-media attacks against him, including descriptions of him as a “Nazi judge”.

The significance of that episode has now returned to the political debate because Gen Muhoozi, whom Singiza is reported to have endorsed, has been one of the most prominent figures in the security establishment during the period in which opposition figures have faced prosecution and detention.

Critics therefore argue that the endorsement creates a new lens through which some of Singiza’s earlier decisions will be viewed.

The Baguma complaint

The controversy also comes shortly after Singiza defended the JSC’s handling of a complaint by Dr Besigye and his aide Obeid Lutale against High Court Judge Emmanuel Baguma.

The complaint accused Baguma of repeatedly denying bail and acting unfairly in proceedings involving Besigye and Lutale.

In July 2026, Singiza said the complaint had failed to meet the Commission’s administrative admissibility threshold.

“We have a threshold for handling complaints. Once the complaint doesn’t meet the administrative criteria, we don’t entertain it,” he said.

For critics, the timing has created an uncomfortable question: how can the chairperson of the disciplinary body maintain public confidence among opposition politicians and litigants if he is simultaneously perceived to be politically aligned with the ruling establishment?

Mpuuga ruling

Another controversial decision came in August 2024, when Singiza ruled in a case concerning controversial parliamentary service awards.

The High Court found that the Shs500 million award to former Leader of Opposition Mathias Mpuuga and Shs400 million awards to three parliamentary commissioners had been provided for in the national budget approved by Parliament.

The court nevertheless ordered disciplinary proceedings against the Clerk to Parliament over aspects of the decision-making and implementation process.

The decision was welcomed by some and criticised by others, adding to Singiza’s growing profile as a judge whose rulings have attracted political attention.

The bigger question

Singiza’s appointment as JSC chairperson was itself politically sensitive. President Museveni appointed him chairperson in March 2025, replacing Justice Benjamin Isingoma Kabiito. He was subsequently vetted and approved before taking the oath of office in April.

At his swearing-in, Singiza promised to sanction errant judicial officers “without fear or favour”. He also rejected suggestions that he was a “cadre judge” aligned to the Executive.

That statement is now likely to be revisited following the reported endorsement of Gen Muhoozi.

The Uganda Law Society (ULS) has separately challenged aspects of the current JSC framework and raised concerns about Singiza’s position, including an allegation that he did not resign his judicial position before assuming full-time duties as JSC chairperson. Those claims are part of a pending constitutional dispute and have not been finally determined by court.

The current controversy, therefore, goes beyond one political endorsement. It touches the central question of whether Ugandans can continue to regard the institutions administering justice as politically neutral.

A judge is entitled to personal political views as a citizen. But judicial office carries restrictions precisely because justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done.

For Singiza, the question is now whether his reported endorsement of Muhoozi can coexist with the explicit requirement under Regulation 4.6 that a judicial officer refrain from active political activity or conduct that creates the appearance of political involvement.

And for the JSC, the larger test may be whether the institution is prepared to apply the same standards to its chairperson that it expects from the judicial officers it recruits, supervises and disciplines.

Until that question is answered, the endorsement is likely to remain a serious test of public confidence in Uganda’s judicial independence.

In Uganda, the financial impact is already significant. According to the Uganda Police Annual Crime Report, more than Shs5.3 billion was lost to cybercrime in 2025. This underlines the need for stronger protection by banks, businesses and individuals.

Many fraud attempts begin with a simple message or phone call. Someone may pretend to be a bank employee and claim that a customer’s account needs to be updated, a PIN must be changed, a transaction reversed or an account urgently secured. The fraudster then asks for confidential information or sends a link to a fake website.

Centenary Bank has repeatedly reminded customers that it will never ask for a PIN, OTP, password or other confidential banking credentials through unsolicited calls, SMS, email or social media messages. Customers who need assistance should always use the Bank’s official communication channels.

The most important rule is simple: never share information that can be used to access your account. This includes your account PIN, ATM PIN, OTP, card details, CVV and password. Customers should also use strong and unique passwords and avoid clicking links sent through SMS, email or WhatsApp when those links ask them to log into their bank account or provide personal information.

Fraudsters often rely on fear and urgency. They may claim that an account will be blocked, a transaction will fail or a reward will expire unless the customer acts immediately. Whenever a banking request feels urgent or unusual, stop the conversation and contact the bank through an official channel before taking any action.

Customers should also pay close attention to SMS and email transaction alerts. Any transaction that is not recognised should be reported immediately, as early reporting gives the bank a better chance to investigate and reduce further loss.

As digital banking grows, banks must also continue strengthening their systems and controls. Centenary Bank has invested in technology, including its Oracle FLEXCUBE core banking platform, to support real-time transaction monitoring and fraud detection. Unusual activity, such as a transaction from an unfamiliar device, location or customer pattern, can be flagged for further review or stopped where necessary.

The Bank has also strengthened internal safeguards through a 24-hour fraud monitoring team and enhanced internal review and assurance activities. Data analytics and risk-based monitoring are used to review transactions, staff access and system activity to identify potential internal and external threats.

Customers also have an important role to play. Through CenteMobile, one can benefit from real-time transaction alerts, two-factor authentication and tools that support quick action where an account is suspected to have been compromised.

October, recognised as Cybersecurity Awareness Month, provides an important opportunity to reinforce these habits. Uganda’s National Cybersecurity Strategy 2022–2026 recognises awareness as an important part of strengthening national cybersecurity resilience and we have seen financial institutions use this period to help customers understand common fraud techniques and the steps they can take to avoid becoming victims.

Fraudsters will continue changing their tactics. The best defence is therefore a combination of strong banking controls, informed customers and constant vigilance. To the customers, protect your credentials, question unexpected requests, verify before acting and report suspicious activity immediately.

The writer is the Manager, Information Security Assurance at Centenary Bank.

By Elison Twinomugisha

Under this partnership, Centenary Bank provides the financing; Airtel Uganda, through its mobile money platform facilitates loan applications, disbursements and repayments, while gnuGrid supports customer profiling to inform credit assessment.

According to Bank of Uganda, digital loan disbursements reached approximately UGX 4.8 trillion across 306.3 million transactions in the 12 months to December 2025. The value of these disbursements increased by 96.1% compared with the previous year. These figures show the growing role of digital channels in access to credit.

While launching the product at Centenary Bank headquarters in Kampala, the Managing Director of Centenary Bank, Godfrey Byekwaso, said this solution supports the bank’s commitment to making banking more convenient through SMART banking. It builds on the bank’s existing digital channels, including GonzaPay, CenteMobile, Internet Banking and Agent Banking giving customers more ways to access financial services.

“As Centenary Bank, we believe that this partnership shall open up doors to more people out there who wish to get quick, instant loans to solve quick challenges,” he said. Byekwaso added that as they roll out Kwaata Sente, emphasis will be placed on customer experience, transparency and responsible lending. Customers should understand the applicable charges, repayment dates and consequences of late repayment before accepting a loan.

“I encourage customers to borrow for genuine need and take only what they can repay within the agreed period. Timely repayment helps build a positive repayment record that may inform future credit assessments,” he said.

Airtel Money Managing Director, Japhet Aritho said Kwaata Sente addresses a real market need by providing eligible Airtel Money customers with convenient access to short-term credit without the need to visit the bank branch or complete a physical paper. “With loans ranging from UGX 10,000 and more, subject to approved limits, customers can access funds directly through their mobile wallet. For a small business owner managing a cash flow or a trader replenishing stock, timely access to credit can make a meaningful difference.”

David Opio Obwangamoi, the CEO of gnuGrid, said the product was put into the pilot phase almost a year ago where they have been doing testing, witnessing the customer experience and how it could stand the test of time when it is launched.

“To me financial inclusion in a practical way is about partnerships, innovations and going beyond the conventional way of doing things and figuring out means to reach the unbanked, and Kwaata Sente in a practical way is going to do exactly that. So, I can’t wait to see all Ugandans being able to access affordable credit from Kwaata Sente anywhere, anytime, and meet those financial needs on a daily basis,” Obwangamoi said. Eligible Airtel customers can access Kwaata Sente by simply dialing *185*8*5# and borrow up to UGX 500,000 directly through Airtel Money.

And, according to Kasambya County MP Daudi Kabanda, the answer emerging from the meeting was his son, Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba. “President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has endorsed General Muhoozi Kainerugaba Museveni at the Central Executive Committee meeting held at Entebbe State House this afternoon,” Mr Kabanda posted on X after the meeting.

The statement immediately reignited the biggest political question surrounding Uganda’s future: Has Mr Museveni finally accepted to hand power to his son?

The reported development is significant because the CEC is one of the NRM’s principal policy and decision-making organs. The party itself says the committee exercises political leadership, formulates policy for consideration by the National Executive Council (NEC), supervises the organisation’s activities and recommends the NRM presidential candidate to the NEC.

But while Mr Kabanda’s announcement suggests a dramatic breakthrough for the Muhoozi succession project, the meeting itself appears to have been more complicated than a simple declaration of a new presidential heir.

The succession paper

According to reports emerging from the meeting, President Museveni presented a paper on succession to the NRM leadership. That alone marked a major departure for a President who has historically avoided publicly naming a successor.

The discussion reportedly centred on the future leadership of the NRM and the growing campaign to position Gen Muhoozi as the presidential candidate for 2031. The President also reportedly made light of his son’s controversial social media activity, saying he likes Gen Muhoozi’s tweets.

That comment may have appeared casual, but it came against a remarkable political transformation in which the CDF’s social-media profile has become inseparable from his political ambitions.

Gen Muhoozi has increasingly used X to comment on national politics, international affairs, security and the future of Uganda. His supporters have, in turn, built a political mobilisation machinery around him through the Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU).

What began years ago as speculation about a possible “Muhoozi Project” has now become an organised campaign for the presidency. And Tuesday’s CEC meeting brought that campaign directly into the NRM’s top leadership.

Kabanda’s declaration

Mr Kabanda’s statement was brief but politically explosive. The former PLU secretary general did not merely say that the President had spoken positively about his son. He used the word “endorsed.” That distinction matters. An endorsement of Gen Muhoozi by Mr Museveni would represent a significant shift from the President’s longstanding reluctance to publicly identify his preferred successor.

The statement also fits with an announcement made by Mr Kabanda in September, when he said Gen Muhoozi would contest the 2031 presidential election and that the candidature had been sanctioned by President Museveni. At the time, the declaration was already seen as a major escalation in the succession debate. But the latest claim takes it further. This time, the alleged endorsement was made in the presence of the NRM’s Central Executive Committee at State House.

The Balaam clue

Even before Tuesday’s meeting, signs had been emerging that President Museveni was increasingly comfortable discussing Gen Muhoozi in glowing terms. One of the President’s press assistants this morning posted a cryptic message that has since acquired greater political significance.

“Last week Pres M7 spoke glowingly about Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba and Minister Balaam (for the times I counted) 8 times! On average that should be once a day with one to spare. This week has already been 6 times and it’s Wednesday. I won’t tell you everything,” the press assistant wrote. The message appeared to invite speculation rather than provide an outright announcement.

But in the context of Tuesday’s CEC meeting, the remark has been interpreted by political observers as another indication that Gen Muhoozi’s name is no longer being treated as a taboo subject in the President’s political calculations.

The frequency with which Mr Museveni is reportedly talking about Gen Muhoozi is itself notable. For years, the President’s public position was that his son was a military officer whose political future should not be confused with his father’s presidency.

Today, Gen Muhoozi is the CDF, chairman of PLU and an openly declared 2031 presidential aspirant. The political language around him has changed.

From “Muhoozi Project” to succession

The succession debate is not new. It exploded into the national political arena in 2013 when then-Coordinator of Intelligence Services Gen David Sejusa raised allegations of a plan to prepare Gen Muhoozi to succeed his father.

The allegations generated intense political controversy. The government rejected the claims, while President Museveni maintained that his son was pursuing a military career. For years, the issue remained politically radioactive. Gen Muhoozi’s subsequent rise through the military hierarchy, however, kept the succession debate alive.

His public profile expanded, his supporters became increasingly organised and his political statements became more direct. By 2022, the general had openly expressed presidential ambitions, bringing the issue firmly into mainstream political debate. In 2024, he said he would not run in the 2026 presidential election and instead supported his father. That appeared to postpone the question. It did not kill it.

By September this year, the 2031 question had returned with full force. Mr Kabanda announced that Gen Muhoozi would seek the presidency in 2031. PLU supporters have since embarked on mobilisation and endorsement activities intended to build a national political base for the general.

The movement has also published endorsements from political figures, including Minister Balaam Barugahara, who said that when President Museveni retires, he would endorse Gen Muhoozi to lead Uganda into the next chapter.

Why the CEC meeting matters

The importance of Tuesday’s meeting lies not simply in Gen Muhoozi’s relationship with his father. It lies in where the discussion took place. The CEC is a key NRM policy organ. Its functions include providing political leadership, formulating policy, advising the President and recommending the party’s presidential candidate to the NEC.

This means that a succession discussion at CEC level takes the issue beyond a family conversation or a social-media campaign. It puts the future of the NRM itself on the agenda. That is why Mr Kabanda’s announcement generated such immediate interest. If Mr Museveni has indeed endorsed his son before the CEC, the next question is whether that endorsement will eventually be converted into a formal NRM position.

And that is where the distinction between personal endorsement and party nomination becomes critical. Reports from the meeting indicate that CEC members wanted the succession paper circulated and that a retreat could be considered to discuss the matter further. That suggests the meeting may not have ended with a final collective decision.

The NRM Secretary General Richard Todwong was contacted over the matter and said he would consult the CEC before responding. This leaves an important question unanswered: Did the CEC endorse Muhoozi, or did it merely discuss Museveni’s proposal? Is Museveni preparing the ground? For Mr Museveni, the succession question is unusually delicate.

He has governed Uganda since 1986 and has repeatedly survived political challenges, constitutional changes and opposition campaigns. The question of who comes after him has therefore always carried implications beyond an individual presidency.

It concerns the future of the NRM, the military establishment, the political networks built around the President and the millions of Ugandans who have known no other NRM leader. By placing succession before the CEC, Mr Museveni has potentially opened a new chapter. And by reportedly presenting a paper that makes the question of succession explicit, he may have signalled that the issue can no longer be indefinitely postponed. The paper is particularly important because it suggests that the discussion is not simply about Gen Muhoozi’s personal ambitions. It is about the transition of the ruling movement.

The PLU problem

But another issue surfaced during the meeting: the relationship between PLU and the NRM. Gen Muhoozi chairs the Patriotic League of Uganda, which has become the principal vehicle through which his supporters are mobilising for 2031.

Some NRM members have reportedly expressed concern that PLU could compete with or weaken the ruling party. This creates a potential contradiction. If Gen Muhoozi is to become the NRM’s presidential candidate, the movement around him would ultimately have to operate within the NRM framework.

The question therefore becomes whether PLU will be absorbed into, aligned with or operate alongside the NRM.

Reports from the CEC meeting indicate that Mr Museveni asked party leaders to leave the matter to him as discussions continue about the relationship between PLU and NRM. That is significant because the President is not merely choosing a possible successor. He is also dealing with the political machinery that has emerged around his son.

What happens next?

The immediate test will be whether the reported CEC discussions translate into a formal party position. The next stage could involve circulation of the succession paper, further consultations among NRM leaders and possibly a retreat where the issue is debated more extensively. There is also the question of Gen Muhoozi’s position as a serving military officer and how his political ambitions will interface with the UPDF’s legal and institutional framework.

But politically, the direction is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. The Muhoozi question is no longer being discussed only at PLU rallies, on X or among political supporters. It is now being discussed at State House and before the NRM’s Central Executive Committee. That represents a profound change. The bigger question, therefore, is no longer whether Gen Muhoozi wants to become President.

He has made his 2031 ambition clear. The question is whether President Museveni is now actively preparing the NRM to accept his son as his successor. Mr Kabanda says the answer is already yes. The CEC discussions suggest the question has moved into the party’s formal political arena. But until the NRM issues a definitive resolution, Uganda is left with a tantalising possibility rather than a completed succession plan. What is certain is that 2031 has now entered the centre of the NRM’s political conversation — and for the first time, President Museveni’s son is sitting at the heart of that conversation.

The 27 Ugandans are part of a group whose fate the Ugandan government has been trying to establish after families raised alarm over relatives who left the country for Russia and subsequently disappeared. A letter dated October 17, 2026, written by Uganda’s Ambassador to Russia, Moses Kizige, to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Bagiire, provides details obtained from Russian authorities. The correspondence says Russia has confirmed the deaths of 11 Ugandans, listed 16 others as missing, and identified five who are still serving in its military.

One other Ugandan, Robert Tumwebaze, was reportedly discharged from the Russian armed forces but subsequently disappeared after being transferred from a military hospital. The embassy warns that the 16 missing Ugandans are effectively presumed dead because their whereabouts are unknown, their bodies have not been recovered and they have not been identified as prisoners of war.

“It is important to note that the persons listed in this category are effectively dead, but their bodies could not be located anywhere. They are also not known to be prisoners of war,” the embassy letter states. The disclosure raises fresh questions about how Ugandan citizens are being recruited into Russia’s war effort and whether some were deliberately deceived into signing up for military service. It also places pressure on the Ugandan government to explain what measures it took to protect citizens after allegations emerged that recruiters were offering civilian employment before sending recruits to military camps.

The 11 Ugandans Confirmed Dead

Russian authorities have confirmed the deaths of the following Ugandans:

Ronald Bugiri

John Male

Francis Ngabirano

Innocent Agaba

Levi Kasule

Bigirwa Mugisa

Richard Twine

Junior Moses Mawejje

Pius Byamugisha

David Buyondo

Godfrey Kamugira

The diplomatic correspondence does not state when or where each individual died. It is also unclear whether their remains have been recovered, identified or handed over to their families.

That uncertainty is likely to deepen the anguish of relatives who have spent months trying to establish whether their loved ones are alive. For families, confirmation of death is only the beginning of another struggle: establishing where their relatives died, recovering their remains and determining who bears responsibility for their recruitment and deployment.

16 missing and presumed dead

Another 16 Ugandans remain unaccounted for.

They are:

Maxima Tindyebwa

Darius Twebaze

Alex Katurebe

Miro Mukasa

Eric Kwesiga

Kosiaa Kusima

Johnson Kakuru

Edwin Musasizi

Vicent Musisi

Nelson Mugyenyi

Alex Akanshabira

David Kiwanuka Ssekisibo

Henry Rwakiziri Bamutina

Stephen Muhame

William Kyoffa

Nelson Lukwita

According to the Ugandan embassy, Russian authorities have not located their bodies and have not listed them as prisoners of war. The embassy therefore considers them effectively dead. The distinction between “missing” and “dead” is, however, significant for the families because it leaves unanswered questions about what happened to their relatives and where their remains may be. Among those listed is William Kyoffa, whose disappearance had already triggered an appeal by his family to the Ugandan government.

Kyoffa reportedly travelled to Russia towards the end of 2025 after being promised employment. His wife, Jennifer Namuli, later appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for help in tracing him. His last known communication with his family was reportedly on February 4, 2026.

He told them that he had been issued a firearm and was being taken towards the frontline in the Donbas region. The communication then stopped. For his family, what began as a search for a missing husband has now become a search for confirmation of death and, potentially, his remains.

From Promised Jobs to the Battlefield

The cases point to a recruitment pattern that has been repeatedly described by relatives of Ugandans who travelled to Russia. Families say their relatives were promised civilian jobs, including positions as security guards, drivers and other workers, with attractive salaries. Instead, some discovered after reaching Russia that they were expected to sign military contracts, undergo training and eventually deploy to the war in Ukraine.

Elizabeth Tabamubi, whose husband Byamugisha travelled to Russia in December 2025, previously told The Observer that he had been promised a job as a security guard. She said a Russian recruiter identified as Dimitry had offered driving and security jobs to her husband and about 30 other Ugandans. The promise of employment, she said, changed after the recruits arrived. Her husband reportedly contacted her to say that he and others had been taken to a military camp. They were subsequently deployed to the battlefield.

The allegations raise a disturbing question: how many Ugandans travelled to Russia believing they were going to work, only to find themselves enrolled in a foreign military and sent into one of the world’s most dangerous battlefields?

Families have also reported receiving photographs of dead relatives through social media rather than through formal communication from Russian or Ugandan authorities. Some relatives have further complained that promised salaries and benefits did not reach them.

Russia confirms the deaths

The latest information followed a diplomatic inquiry initiated by Ambassador Kizige after Ugandan families began demanding government intervention. In August, Kizige reportedly received several telephone calls from Innocent Kato, who was coordinating families seeking information about missing Ugandans.

Kato provided passport details of some of the missing citizens. The ambassador then verified the identities through Uganda’s Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control. On August 19, the Ugandan embassy contacted Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeking information about the citizens.

Russia responded on October 8, providing information on Ugandans confirmed dead, those missing, those still serving and one person who had been discharged. Ambassador Kizige subsequently forwarded the information to Kampala. The embassy also urged the government to communicate the findings to affected families.

Five Ugandans still in Russia’s military

The Russian authorities also identified five Ugandans who remain in military service.

They are:

Rogers Mwebaze

Evarist Barigye

Honest Mugabi

Eric Kisakye

Ronald Samula Tenywa

The diplomatic communication indicates that the five are expected to leave military service when their contracts expire. Their continued presence in the Russian military means that, despite the deaths already confirmed, Ugandans remain exposed to the fighting.

The Man who Disappeared from Hospital

The case of Robert Tumwebaze presents another troubling element. Tumwebaze was reportedly discharged from the Russian armed forces but disappeared after being transferred from a military hospital in Nizhny Novgorod.

His whereabouts had not been established by the time of the embassy’s October 17 communication. His case illustrates the difficulty Ugandan authorities face in tracking citizens who enter Russia through private recruitment arrangements and subsequently become part of the military system.

Government under pressure

The Ugandan government initially appeared cautious about assuming responsibility for citizens who died while fighting abroad. In February 2026, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Henry Okello Oryem said Uganda did not have the financial capacity to repatriate the bodies of citizens who die abroad.

“The government of Uganda does not have the capacity to repatriate the bodies of Ugandans who lose their lives abroad. That is why we advise Ugandans travelling abroad to go through official channels,” Oryem said. His comments followed reports of the death of Edson Kamwesigye, another Ugandan reportedly killed while fighting for Russian forces in Ukraine. Kamwesigye’s family had sought government assistance to recover his body.

Earlier reports had also named Michael Atuhaire and Ashiraf Damulira among Ugandans killed while serving in Russian forces. Their deaths featured in a February 2026 investigation into the recruitment of African nationals into Russia’s war effort. As more families came forward, the government was forced to deepen its diplomatic inquiries.

On July 23, 2026, Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Vincent Bagiire directed Ambassador Kizige to investigate allegations that Ugandans had been trafficked to Russia and subsequently deployed to the battlefield. The October diplomatic correspondence appears to be one of the most concrete outcomes of that inquiry.

A trail of unanswered questions

The confirmation of 11 deaths and 16 presumed deaths leaves several questions unanswered. Who recruited the Ugandans? Were they knowingly signing military contracts, or were they deceived by promises of civilian employment? How many Ugandans have been recruited into Russia’s military? How much were they promised in salaries and benefits? Were recruitment agents operating in Uganda legally?

And if Ugandans were trafficked or deceived into military service, what action has been taken against the individuals involved? There is also the question of accountability for the dead. Kato, who has been coordinating efforts by families to trace their relatives, has demanded that Russia account for the Ugandans recruited into its military.

“For those who died, there should be accountability. Russia should account for these people. They were serving under Russia, and it should account for them,” he said. The October diplomatic correspondence provides families with something they have been seeking for months: official confirmation that many of their relatives did not simply disappear.

But for the 11 families of those confirmed dead, and the 16 families whose relatives are presumed dead, the government must now answer a more difficult question. What happened to their loved ones after they were recruited, and who will bring them home?

The fate of the Ugandans also exposes the risks faced by job-seekers who leave the country through informal recruitment networks, particularly when lucrative employment promises are made in countries involved in active conflicts.

For the families waiting for answers, the Russian battlefield is no longer a distant war. It has become the place where their sons, husbands and relatives disappeared — and, in at least 11 cases, where Ugandan citizens lost their lives.

The new package line-up is designed around how customers watch today, with clearer choices, more accessible content and greater value across the portfolio.

“Our focus is on giving subscribers better value and access to the entertainment they love,” said Hassan Saleh, CEO of MultiChoice Uganda. “DStv’s strength is the combination of African entertainment, leading international content and unrivalled live sport in one place. We’ve reimagined our packages to better reflect how customers watch today, with tailored options specifically for general entertainment and sports fans.”

For the first time, some of DStv’s biggest channels will be available at significantly more accessible price points.

DStv Access becomes DStv Starter, adding 10 more channels than its predecessor, including the brand-new SuperSport KICKOFF channel, which brings selected football from the world’s biggest competitions, including the Premier League and UEFA Champions League.

DStv Family becomes DStv Select, offering a wide variety of entertainment for the whole family. Subscribers will enjoy all movie channels, local and international series, a selection of top football and other sport, as well as the complete kids’ channel offering.

DStv’s movie line-up has also been refreshed with M-Net Movies+, M-Net Stars and M-Net Legends, bringing more blockbuster movies, faster access to new releases and fewer repeats.

DStv Compact becomes DStv Sports. This is DStv’s first package built specifically for sports fans, with 17 channels covering every Premier League and UEFA Champions League match, cricket previously only available on DStv Premium, selected international club rugby, WWE and UFC.

“For the first time, we are not talking about economics, we are talking about customers speaking and the entity listening. This is really something to celebrate for the consumer. I congratulate MultiChoice Uganda for being sensitive to the needs of their customers and to being able to apply all the modules, to listening and bringing them to effect,” said Julianne Mweheire, Director of Industry Affairs and Content Development, Uganda Communications Commission (UCC).

Alongside this extensive sporting offering, DStv Sports includes all the general entertainment channels available on DStv Select, proving that Expect More is not simply a new brand tagline, but a tangible promise delivered through DStv’s refreshed content offering.

DStv Premium becomes DStv Ultimate. It remains DStv’s most comprehensive package, combining everything available on DStv Sports with additional premium sport, including Formula 1, MotoGP, Grand Slam tennis and golf majors, as well as the best international series on M-Net.

Tailored sports experiences for East African audiences

Beyond expanding access to world-class sport through its new package line-up, MultiChoice continues to invest in content experiences that resonate with audiences across the continent.

As part of this commitment, the business is launching SuperSport Swahili, a dedicated 24/7 Swahili-language sports channel created specifically for East African audiences. Launching on 5 November, the channel brings together world-class football, international sporting events and original sports programming with Swahili commentary, studio analysis and regional storytelling.

Available to customers in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, SuperSport Swahili will feature a compelling line-up including the Premier League, UEFA competitions, La Liga, Serie A, international football, athletics, UFC, WWE and locally relevant sports content, making it easier than ever for fans to experience the sport they love in the language they love.

As part of the MultiChoice Group’s integration with CANAL+, the business is able to draw on CANAL+’s global scale, content relationships and more than 30 years of experience across Africa to further enhance its offering to customers.

At the same time, MultiChoice remains firmly committed to investing in local content and telling authentic African stories. The business continues to expand its portfolio of original productions across markets, ensuring audiences can enjoy a rich mix of locally relevant entertainment alongside the very best international content. Over the next few months, viewers can look forward to Kampala Crème Season 4, Musama, Home of our Stars season 4, Tie the Knot, an interesting look on relationships and Short and Byg Show, a popular podcast by social media sensations Isaac Katende aka Kasuku and Shamim Mayanja aka Zubeda.

New price breakdown

Starter package with 85+ channels will cost Shs25,000. The entry-level package offers more than 85 channels, about 10 more than the former Access package. It includes SuperSport KICKOFF, Moja Love, Star Life, Discovery Family and Curiosity, among others. Football coverage includes all La Liga matches and selected Premier League, UEFA Champions League and Ligue 1 games.

Select package with 100+ channels will cost Shs60,000. Designed for family entertainment, this package adds M-Net Movies+, M-Net Stars, M-Net Legends, Discovery ID, History Channel, CNN and all children’s channels to the Starter offering.

Sports package with 115+ channels will cost Shs100,000. The sports-focused package has 17 sports channels and includes everything in Select. Subscribers get every Premier League and UEFA Champions League match, as well as cricket, the URC match of the week, UFC, WWE and basketball.

Ultimate package with 135+ channels will cost Shs185,000. The top-tier package combines the full Sports offering with M-Net and premium international sporting events, including international rugby, ATP tennis, PGA Tour golf and Formula 1.

The new line-up gives subscribers a choice between basic entertainment at Shs25,000, expanded family programming at Shs60,000, comprehensive sports coverage at Shs100,000, and the full premium offering at Shs185,000.

The same monthly prices apply across the DStv and GOtv offerings under the new package structure.

The decision means the historic site will retain its existing legal status as a protected heritage area, with government abandoning the proposed redevelopment that had envisaged a modern commercial complex featuring a hotel, shopping facilities and other amenities.

The decision was announced Tuesday by Minister of ICT and National Guidance Rt Hon Justine Kasule Lumumba during the weekly Cabinet press briefing, where she said Cabinet had considered the history, legal protection, environmental concerns and urban planning implications surrounding the site. “Cabinet has decided to reverse the proposal for the development of City Square, formally known as Constitutional Square, and retain the site’s existing legal status,” Ms Lumumba said.

She added that the decision followed consideration of “the site’s history, its legal protection, and the environmental and urban planning issues raised by the proposal.” The Cabinet resolution effectively closes the latest attempt to redevelop the prime piece of land in Kampala’s central business district, which had attracted strong political, legal and environmental opposition. Ms Lumumba said Constitution Square is a protected heritage site whose protection dates back to 2007 and is recognised under the Museums and Monuments Act, 2023, as well as a heritage protection instrument issued in 2024.

She said the protected area covers approximately 1.172 hectares comprising plots 5, 6 and 7, and includes the 1945 War Memorial, which commemorates Ugandan soldiers who died during the First and Second World Wars. “The Square and its memorial are part of our national history. Decisions about the site must respect that history and its protected status,” she said. “The public should therefore be clear: Cabinet has reversed the development proposal. Constitution Square will retain its existing legal status.”

Balimwezo welcomes decision

The Cabinet decision vindicates Kampala Lord Mayor Ronald Balimwezo, who had mounted a sustained campaign against the redevelopment proposal, arguing that the square was too important to be surrendered to commercial development. Mr Balimwezo had warned that the site serves as one of Kampala’s few remaining open spaces and plays an important environmental, recreational and emergency-response role.

He said the square should remain open rather than be converted into a commercial facility. “City Square must be left open. It is the City Square that helps us breathe. It must not be played with. That is our take,” Mr Balimwezo said during the earlier controversy. The Lord Mayor had also petitioned Attorney General Sam Mayanja to advise Cabinet against the proposal, arguing that Constitution Square was public land held in trust for Ugandans.

In his September 12 communication, Mr Balimwezo said the site had been set aside in 1903 by the colonial administration as Government Square and had subsequently acquired significant civic, historical and constitutional importance. He also cited the Kampala Capital City Authority Act and Article 237 of the Constitution in arguing that KCCA had a duty to protect the land.

“Section 11 of the KCCA Act 2010, and Article 237(2)(a) of the Constitution, this City Square is public land held in trust by KCCA for the people of Uganda. My office has a statutory duty to protect it,” he stated. Mr Balimwezo further warned that concreting the site could worsen Kampala’s environmental problems, particularly flooding and rising temperatures.

He described the square as a carbon sink, dust filter and storm-water soakaway in the heart of the city. His position received support from several political actors and civic groups who argued that Kampala was already losing public and green spaces to private development.

Kabanda’s committee

The Cabinet decision came after an inter-ministerial committee chaired by Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs Minister Hajjat Minsa Kabanda examined the redevelopment proposal. President Museveni had on August 30 directed Ms Kabanda to study a proposal submitted by businessman Hassan Bulwadda to develop about two acres of City Square into a modern, eco-friendly real estate complex.

The proposed project was to include a hotel, shopping mall and other commercial facilities, with solar power incorporated into the development. Ms Kabanda subsequently constituted a multi-agency committee to examine the proposal and provide government with advice. By October 19, the committee had completed its investigation and submitted its findings for consideration.

Ms Kabanda said the committee had considered several factors, including the historical significance of the sites, tourism potential and location. “We involved other ministries like Lands and the Solicitor General, and they have shared their thoughts with us in a report that is going to be delivered to the President,” she said. The committee’s work had followed growing questions over whether the proposed development was compatible with the square’s existing heritage status and its role as a public space.

Ms Kabanda had also maintained that the land remained under KCCA, amid competing claims concerning previous development arrangements involving the site. The committee’s assessment therefore brought together questions of land ownership, heritage protection, planning, investment and the public interest.

From development plan to Cabinet reversal

The proposal had initially gained momentum after Mr Bulwadda submitted his plan to President Museveni. In his August 30 directive, President Museveni asked Ms Kabanda to examine the proposal, consult KCCA and report back to him. The proposal was not itself a final allocation of the land to the developer. The planned development triggered immediate opposition from Kampala political leaders, environmentalists and other stakeholders.

The Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, Joel Ssenyonyi, also questioned why Parliament had not been involved in discussions concerning the future of the public space. Government initially sought to calm the controversy, saying the President had merely directed ministers to study the proposal.

But the dispute intensified when the proposed designs emerged showing a multi-storey commercial development, including retail facilities, parking, landscaped areas, fountains and solar panels. Supporters of the project argued that the redevelopment could modernise Kampala’s city centre, attract investment, create jobs and introduce a better-managed public environment.

Attorney General Sam Mayanja had also defended the redevelopment argument, saying the square had become a security concern and could be modernised while retaining green areas and the existing monument. However, opponents maintained that commercial development could permanently alter a protected heritage site and remove one of the capital’s remaining open spaces.

Heritage Status Settles the Dispute

Cabinet’s latest position now places the legal and heritage status of the square at the centre of its future. Ms Lumumba’s statement makes clear that the government is not merely suspending the proposal for further review but reversing it and retaining the existing legal status of the property. The 1945 War Memorial remains an important part of the site, giving the square significance beyond its environmental and recreational functions.

The decision also signals a shift in the government’s position after weeks in which the proposed redevelopment had appeared to gain momentum. For KCCA’s political leadership, the reversal provides relief from fears that the city could lose one of its remaining open spaces. For heritage conservationists, it preserves a site that has been part of Kampala’s civic landscape for more than a century.

And for the government, Cabinet’s resolution brings an end — at least for now — to a dispute that had brought questions of investment, public land, environmental protection and national heritage into direct conflict. The immediate consequence is that Constitution Square will remain what it has historically been: an open public space and protected heritage site in the heart of Kampala. Cabinet’s message, delivered through Ms Lumumba, was unequivocal: the proposed commercial redevelopment is off the table, and the square’s existing legal protection will remain in force.

The announcement, made on Tuesday, by Colonel Chris Magezi, the Acting Director of Defence Public Information, places Otto’s departure from the sensitive intelligence position among the latest developments in a period of upheaval within the military leadership.

Munanura, who previously served as Otto’s deputy, has been appointed Chief of Defence Intelligence and Security (CDIS), a position that places him at the centre of the UPDF’s intelligence-gathering, security coordination and counter-intelligence responsibilities. Otto, the outgoing intelligence chief, has been seconded to the Joint Staff Human Resource Management for redeployment, according to the official statement.

Although the UPDF described the change as a routine leadership transition and commended Otto for his service, the timing is likely to attract attention because it comes against the background of the dramatic demotion of Lieutenant General (Rtd) Peter Elwelu and reports of interrogations involving military personnel over the former general’s affairs.

The military has not officially linked Otto’s reassignment to the Elwelu controversy, and no evidence has been publicly presented establishing that the intelligence chief is under investigation or that he committed any wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the change raises questions about the future of the military’s intelligence leadership as the institution deals with developments involving one of its formerly senior commanders.

Otto’s exit amid Elwelu controversy

Otto’s departure comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the UPDF following the announcement that Elwelu, a retired lieutenant general, had been stripped of his rank and reduced to private, the lowest rank in the army’s formal hierarchy.

The action against Elwelu, announced by Chief of Defence Forces General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, was followed by reports of a security operation at the former general’s home, where a cache of weapons and ammunition, including AK-47 rifles and submachine guns, was reportedly recovered. The reported recovery of the weapons has added another dimension to the questions surrounding Elwelu, his military career and the circumstances leading to his demotion.

However, the circumstances under which the weapons were allegedly found, their ownership and whether their possession violated any applicable laws or military regulations require clarification from the authorities. The developments have also generated interest in the former commander’s relationships within the military establishment, including his reported friendship with Otto.

Sources and reports circulating around the developments have suggested that about 20 UPDF personnel have been interrogated in connection with matters surrounding Elwelu. Otto has been mentioned in claims that he may be among those questioned.

That allegation, however, has not been independently confirmed in the official statement announcing his replacement. The UPDF has not publicly identified the alleged 20 personnel, explained the scope of the reported interrogations or confirmed that Otto was among those interviewed.

It would therefore be premature to conclude that Otto’s redeployment was punishment for his association with Elwelu or that it constitutes evidence of wrongdoing. What is clear is that the change places the former intelligence chief outside the leadership of the directorate at a time when the military is facing questions over the Elwelu affair.

The distinction between a reassignment and disciplinary action is important. Magezi’s statement does not announce Otto’s arrest, suspension or prosecution. It says he has been seconded to the Joint Staff Human Resource Management for redeployment. The precise duties Otto will assume next have not been disclosed.

A sensitive intelligence office changes hands

The Chief of Defence Intelligence and Security is one of the UPDF’s most sensitive appointments, given the role of military intelligence in identifying security threats, assessing risks to the armed forces and supporting command decisions.

The directorate’s work involves intelligence analysis, military security and counter-intelligence functions. Its leadership is therefore central to the military’s ability to assess internal and external threats while safeguarding operational information.

A change at the top of such a directorate can have consequences beyond the appointment itself, particularly where questions about command relationships, institutional accountability and internal security are attracting public attention.

Munanura’s appointment is notable because he is not an outsider brought into the directorate. He was serving as Otto’s deputy, meaning he is expected to assume leadership with prior experience of the institution’s work and operational structures. His promotion to acting major general accompanies his appointment as the new CDIS.

The acting designation indicates that the appointment has been announced at that rank in an acting capacity. The statement does not provide further details on whether or when a substantive confirmation will follow. Magezi’s announcement was framed as a message of continuity, with the UPDF congratulating Munanura and commending Otto for what it described as the great work he had done during his tenure.

The statement did not cite misconduct, operational failure or any specific incident as the reason for Otto’s departure. That omission leaves the public without an official explanation of why the change was made at this particular time, although military transfers and redeployments can occur for a variety of administrative, operational and command-related reasons. The timing alone cannot establish a connection between the reassignment and the Elwelu investigations reportedly under way.

From battlefield commander to intelligence chief

Otto’s military career stretches back four decades, having joined the army in 1986 and risen through the ranks while serving in domestic and regional security operations. His background includes command responsibilities in Uganda’s campaigns against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), deployments in the Central African Republic and Somalia, and leadership of the UPDF’s operations against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Before his appointment as intelligence chief in April 2025, Otto commanded the UPDF Mountain Infantry Division, based in Fort Portal, while also serving as commander of Operation Shujaa, the joint Uganda-DR Congo military campaign against the ADF.

His operational experience made him a significant figure in the military’s regional security engagements. Otto also commanded the UPDF’s Third Infantry Division in Moroto, served as commander of Uganda’s military contingent in the Central African Republic and led Ugandan troops deployed to Somalia under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

His service in the Central African Republic was associated with the regional military effort against the LRA, while his Somalia assignment placed him in charge of Ugandan troops participating in the African Union’s operations in support of the Somali government.

In 2023, President Museveni promoted Otto from brigadier general to major general and appointed him to chair the Security Supervisory Mechanism under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace framework in South Sudan. His responsibilities included monitoring implementation of the security provisions of the South Sudan peace agreement.

He subsequently returned to a command role in Uganda before Muhoozi appointed him chief of defence intelligence and security on April 16, 2025, replacing Major General James Birungi. The appointment was announced by Magezi, who said the changes took immediate effect. Birungi was reassigned to command the Mountain Infantry Division, creating a direct exchange of positions between the two senior officers.

Otto formally took over the intelligence office at a ceremony at the Defence Intelligence and Security headquarters in Mbuya later that month. His tenure at the intelligence directorate has therefore lasted approximately 18 months, from April 2025 to October 2026.

What Munanura brings to the office

Otto’s successor, Munanura, is familiar with the military intelligence establishment, having served as deputy CDIS. His promotion to acting major general and elevation to the top intelligence position suggest that the UPDF intends to maintain continuity within the directorate while changing its leadership.

Munanura has previously held responsibilities connected to counter-intelligence and defence-related work. His military career includes operational and staff assignments, while his background has also included work with Kyoga Dynamics, a subsidiary of the National Enterprise Corporation involved in defence-industrial activities.

His appointment follows earlier changes within the military intelligence structure, including the replacement of Colonel Abdul Rugumayo as deputy chief of military intelligence in March 2026, when Munanura was appointed to the role.

The latest announcement elevates him from deputy to chief, giving him responsibility for the directorate at a time when the military’s internal security arrangements and senior command relationships are under scrutiny.

The intelligence office has an important role in identifying security risks, evaluating information reaching the command and ensuring that military decisions are informed by credible intelligence. It also operates in a sensitive environment in which the distinction between legitimate intelligence work, internal disciplinary investigations and allegations of misconduct is critical. Munanura’s immediate challenge will be to take over Otto’s responsibilities while maintaining the directorate’s operations and addressing any questions arising from the current military developments.

The UPDF statement, however, does not indicate whether Munanura’s appointment is connected to any specific investigation or whether the change is part of a wider review of the intelligence service.

The wider questions facing the UPDF

The leadership change comes amid wider questions about accountability and the handling of sensitive matters within the military. Elwelu’s demotion is particularly significant because of his former position in the UPDF hierarchy and his record as a field commander.

During his military career, Elwelu commanded the Second Infantry Division, whose troops were involved in the December 2016 security operation at the palace of the Rwenzururu king, Charles Wesley Mumbere, in Kasese. The operation resulted in numerous deaths, including members of the royal guards and other people at the palace. Elwelu subsequently became one of the most prominent military figures associated with the operation.

His later rise through the ranks placed him among the army’s senior commanders before his eventual retirement. The circumstances surrounding his latest demotion, the reported weapons recovery at his residence and claims of interrogations involving other officers have therefore attracted attention beyond his personal military career.

For the UPDF, the key questions concern the reasons for the action against Elwelu, the legal and administrative basis of the demotion, the status of the reported weapons and whether any serving or retired officers face formal allegations. The reported questioning of about 20 soldiers, if confirmed, would also require clarification about whether the exercise is part of a criminal investigation, an internal security inquiry or a disciplinary process.

Investigators would need to establish the relevance of any individual’s conduct rather than rely on personal associations or professional relationships as proof of wrongdoing. The same principle applies to Otto. His reported friendship with Elwelu may attract attention because of his former position as intelligence chief, but friendship alone is not evidence of involvement in any alleged offence. Nor does the fact that Otto has been reassigned establish that he has been interrogated. The military has not publicly confirmed that claim in the announcement of his departure.

A transition without an official explanation

The immediate question is whether Otto’s reassignment is an ordinary personnel decision or part of a broader review of military intelligence leadership. The official statement provides no detailed explanation beyond confirming that Otto has been seconded to Joint Staff Human Resource Management for redeployment.

Such wording leaves open the possibility of a subsequent appointment elsewhere in the military establishment. It does not, by itself, amount to a dismissal from military service or a declaration that he is facing disciplinary proceedings. The UPDF also commended Otto for his work, a gesture consistent with an official transfer announcement rather than an explicit disciplinary notice.

Nevertheless, the timing will continue to invite scrutiny unless the military clarifies whether the change has any connection to the developments surrounding Elwelu. The appointment of Munanura also means that a new officer will oversee the intelligence directorate during a period when the military’s handling of sensitive information, internal investigations and senior officers’ accountability is attracting public interest.

For now, the established facts are that Otto has left the intelligence chief’s position, Munanura has been promoted to acting major general and appointed his successor, and the UPDF has announced that Otto will be redeployed.

The claims linking Otto to interrogations over Elwelu remain unconfirmed publicly. Whether the reassignment has any connection to those claims can only be established through an authoritative explanation from the military or further verifiable evidence. Until then, the change marks a significant leadership transition within one of the UPDF’s most sensitive directorates, but the reasons behind it remain undisclosed.