GEN KATUMBA WAMALA IN THE SPOTLIGHT: Why Parliament Summoned Katumba Wamala and Allen Kagina! Road Construction Scandals Deepen as Probing Losses, Contract Controversies and Management Failures Take Form

The latest questions surrounding Gen Edward Katumba Wamala’s stewardship of Uganda’s roads are opening a new and potentially uncomfortable chapter in the career of one of President Yoweri Museveni’s longest-serving military commanders.

At the centre of the emerging storm are three major road projects — the Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo road, the Busega–Mpigi Expressway and the Kampala–Entebbe Expressway — alongside the fate of the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA), whose dissolution and merger into the Ministry of Works and Transport took place under Katumba’s watch.

The allegations circulating around the road sector do not, by themselves, establish wrongdoing by Gen Katumba or former UNRA executive director Allen Kagina. But they raise a more fundamental question now being put to Parliament: where does political and administrative responsibility end when serious irregularities occur under senior officials’ watch?

That question has become more urgent after reports that Parliament has summoned Katumba and Kagina to respond to concerns surrounding alleged losses and management of the Kampala–Entebbe Expressway.

The summons places two officials who once represented the institutional face of Uganda’s road-development programme directly before legislators seeking explanations about projects and systems they supervised.

And behind the parliamentary inquiry lies a deeper story — one involving the relationship between Katumba, President Museveni and Gen Salim Saleh.

The Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo Intelligence File

The story begins with a project whose strategic importance was never in doubt. The Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo corridor was designed to transform connectivity in West Nile, linking refugee-hosting districts and opening a major route towards South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The World Bank approved $130.8 million for the project in 2020. The project was intended to upgrade about 105 kilometres of road and strengthen UNRA’s capacity to manage environmental, social and road-safety risks.

By 2022, according to intelligence information and sources cited by The Investigator, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) was among the companies strongly favoured to execute the project. CCCC was hardly an unknown player in Uganda.

The Chinese company had already been associated with some of Uganda’s most significant road infrastructure projects, including the Kampala–Entebbe Expressway. Its profile, experience and relationship with the Ugandan government made it a formidable bidder.

Sources claim that CCCC was confident it would win the Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo contract after submitting what was understood to be the lowest bid.

The company reportedly went as far as preparing its workforce, recruiting engineers, community liaison officers and other support personnel in anticipation of commencement.

But the procurement process allegedly took an unexpected turn. According to sources familiar with the matter, another bidder was encouraged to raise concerns with the World Bank over the size of CCCC’s bid, with the argument that it was abnormally low and could compromise the quality of construction. There is an important distinction here.

The World Bank itself confirms that its procurement rules require a bidder whose price appears abnormally low to provide clarification and demonstrate its capacity to perform the contract. If the explanation is considered inadequate, the bid can be rejected.

The Bank says this mechanism is designed to protect value for money and ensure integrity, fairness and efficiency in procurement.

The official record, however, shows that CCCC did not eventually receive the Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo civil works contract.

Instead, the civil works contract was awarded to Zhongmei Engineering Group Limited and signed in March 2024. Construction commenced in July 2024 under a 36-month contract.

What happened between the earlier procurement process and the eventual award remains a matter requiring documentary clarification. That is where the political dimension enters.

Sources allege that CCCC had enjoyed the backing of Gen Salim Saleh, the President’s younger brother and one of the most influential figures within Uganda’s establishment.

According to these sources, the failure to secure the contract was interpreted within powerful circles as more than a procurement disagreement. It was seen as a setback involving people who had been closely associated with Saleh.

The allegation that Saleh personally intervened in the procurement process, however, has not been independently established, and should not be treated as fact without documentary evidence. What is beyond dispute is that the project went ahead under a different contractor.

And today the World Bank records the project as active, with the road being implemented through Works and Transport Ministry and the new contractor.

Did The Road Dispute Damage Katumba’s Relationship with Saleh?

This is where the intelligence narrative becomes particularly sensitive. Sources claim that Saleh became increasingly dissatisfied with the way the roads sector was being managed and that Katumba, once regarded as a trusted figure, began losing some of the influence he previously enjoyed.

The sources further connect this alleged deterioration in relations to the eventual rationalisation of UNRA. However, UNRA’s merger was not a secret operation. It was part of a broader government rationalisation programme affecting several agencies.

Indeed, Katumba himself argued before Parliament that abolishing UNRA would reduce government expenditure and eliminate what he described as bloated government structures. He told Parliament that the restructuring could generate substantial savings.

The proposal nevertheless encountered resistance. Parliamentarians warned that dismantling UNRA could undermine road delivery, while others pointed to the cost of compensating staff and the institutional capacity that would be lost. The irony is difficult to miss.

A body that had once been regarded as one of the most technically capable institutions in government was ultimately absorbed into the ministry headed by the minister who had been supervising the broader roads sector. Allen Kagina, meanwhile, had been the public face of UNRA’s professional management for years.

The Busega–Mpigi Question

The second strand of the investigation concerns the Busega–Mpigi Expressway. Security and intelligence reports cited by sources reportedly questioned how major irregularities in the road sector could allegedly occur without senior supervisors detecting them.

The argument being advanced is simple: if junior engineers or officials are held responsible for failures in project management, what responsibility should attach to the officials who supervised them? That argument has now become politically significant. A source quoted in the intelligence briefing put it bluntly:

“You cannot arrest junior staff and ignore their boss. Both Katumba and Kagina have to take responsibilities as supervisors.” That statement is an allegation, not a finding of guilt.

But it captures the central accountability question facing Parliament. The Busega–Mpigi corridor has repeatedly attracted attention because of delays, financing problems and questions about implementation.

The Works Ministry has acknowledged that road construction projects across the country have suffered serious delays because of unpaid contractors. Early this year, Katumba disclosed that government owed road contractors Sh1.351 trillion, with projects including the Busega–Mpigi Expressway among those affected.

The ministry has therefore faced an uncomfortable balancing act: defending its stewardship while simultaneously explaining why projects under its supervision have stalled.

Katumba Breaks His Silence

It was against this background that Gen Katumba moved to distance himself from the growing road controversy.

In an interview with New Vision, the minister sought to separate himself from allegations surrounding the road sector and the schemes being investigated.

His position has essentially been that individual officials responsible for particular transactions should answer for their decisions and that his office should not automatically be treated as responsible for every operational failure within a large ministry. That defence is consistent with Katumba’s long-standing public posture. He has repeatedly presented himself as a supervisor and policy overseer rather than the technical officer executing individual contracts.

Indeed, during the recent controversy surrounding stalled roads, Katumba said investigations should determine responsibility rather than allowing premature conclusions to be drawn.

“The investigations will establish more than just the cause of death,” he said in another context while discussing the Rajiv Ruparelia road accident investigation, urging the public not to speculate before investigators completed their work. That position is now being tested by Parliament.

If the minister was the political head of the sector, legislators will want to know how much he knew, when he knew it and what action he took.

Enter The Entebbe Expressway

The Kampala–Entebbe Expressway has added another layer to the controversy. The road, constructed with Chinese financing, became Uganda’s flagship modern highway and eventually introduced tolling. Katumba and Kagina were both deeply associated with its operationalisation.

Katumba announced the tolling arrangements, while UNRA under Kagina was responsible for administering the road. The road currently operates with toll plazas and an electronic payment system.

Earlier parliamentary scrutiny had already raised questions about toll collections, maintenance expenditures and the handling of revenues. Parliamentary oversight documents have questioned aspects of the road’s implementation and maintenance, including lighting and other contractual obligations. The latest allegations are more explosive.

A parliamentary committee reportedly found that the tolling system occasionally freezes, allowing vehicles to pass without payment. That claim has triggered public scepticism.

One social-media user asked a simple question: if motorists have consistently paid whenever using the road, when exactly does the system freeze?

Others have alleged that failures involving electronic cards were different from actual non-payment because motorists could still pay cash.

These are public reactions, not established findings. But they illustrate the growing distrust surrounding the tolling system.Another criticism concerns the decision to contract an operator to collect and manage tolls rather than allowing a government agency such as URA to handle revenue collection.

The debate has become particularly sensitive because the expressway was presented as a revenue-generating asset whose tolls would help meet operational and financing obligations.

In 2021, Kagina defended the tolling system and said government institutions should pay for using the road like other motorists.

The system was therefore designed around accountability at multiple levels — contractor, UNRA, ministry and ultimately government. Parliament now appears determined to trace that chain.

Why Katumba And Kagina?

The summons of Katumba and Kagina is significant because both men and women associated with the roads sector have previously enjoyed considerable institutional credibility.

Kagina was known for her technocratic approach and her years at UNRA. Katumba, a former Chief of Defence Forces and former Inspector General of Police, brought enormous political and security stature to the Works Ministry. That combination once appeared to offer government an unusually strong leadership structure. Today, however, the same hierarchy is being examined from another angle.

If junior officials allegedly mishandled funds or contracts, did senior management provide adequate supervision? If toll revenues were allegedly lost, who was responsible for designing the collection system? If roads stalled, was the problem funding, procurement, supervision, contractors — or a combination of all four?

And if procurement disputes involving major Chinese contractors generated political fallout, who ultimately carried responsibility? Those are questions that Parliament cannot answer through political rhetoric alone.

It will need contracts, evaluation reports, internal audit reports, payment schedules, procurement correspondence, tolling data and minutes of key decision-making meetings.

The Saleh Factor

Perhaps the most intriguing part of the story remains the alleged fallout between Katumba and Gen Salim Saleh. For years, Katumba was regarded as one of the President’s trusted military officers.

His career moved through some of the most important positions in the security establishment before he transitioned into civilian administration. But the politics of influence in Uganda rarely operate only through formal job descriptions.

The intelligence narrative presented to The Investigator suggests that Saleh’s relationship with Katumba cooled as disagreements emerged around roads, contractors and institutional restructuring. There is no public evidence establishing that Museveni has fallen out with Katumba.

Nor is there publicly verified evidence that Saleh ordered UNRA’s dissolution because of the Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo procurement dispute. Those claims therefore remain allegations requiring proof.

What can be established is that UNRA was eventually dissolved, its functions mainstreamed into the Works Ministry, and the sector subsequently became more centralised. And the person now carrying the political responsibility for that consolidated system is Katumba.

Parliament’s Moment Of Truth

The appearance of Katumba and Kagina before Parliament could therefore become much more than a routine committee session.

Their critics may see it as the beginning of accountability for years of problems in the roads sector. Their defenders may see it as another attempt to blame senior officials for failures caused by financing shortages, contractors and bureaucratic weaknesses. There is also a possibility that the hearings will produce little beyond competing explanations. But one thing has changed.

For perhaps the first time in recent years, the political protection traditionally surrounding senior roads-sector officials is being tested in public through formal parliamentary scrutiny.

The question is no longer merely whether Katumba is personally implicated in a particular scandal. The harder question is whether, as minister, he exercised sufficient oversight over a sector handling billions of shillings and enormous public infrastructure projects. The same question applies to Kagina for the period when she headed UNRA.

And the Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo procurement controversy provides a useful starting point because the World Bank’s own documents establish the importance of procurement integrity and explicitly recognise the risks associated with abnormally low bids.

The road sector is therefore approaching a decisive accountability test. For Katumba, the stakes are personal as well as institutional. His public career has been built around discipline, command and responsibility. Now Parliament is asking whether those principles should apply at the very top of the roads hierarchy.

And if the hearings go beyond the junior officials to examine the people who supervised them, the question that began with Koboko–Yumbe–Moyo could eventually reach the highest levels of Uganda’s infrastructure establishment: Who knew what, who authorised what, who failed to act — and who ultimately takes responsibility when the road to accountability reaches the top?

Author Profile

Pius Kiyimba: Kiyimba Pius is a senior editor at The Investigator. He joined in 2018. His journalism background includes writing for both business and human rights. Connect with him by email: [email protected]